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Abstract  
The Internet of Things (IoT) consists of billions of people, things and services having the 
potential to interact with each other and their environment. This highly interconnected global 
network structure presents new types of challenges from a security, trust and privacy 
perspective. Hence, security for IoT will be a critical concern that must be addressed in order 
to enable several current and future applications. The resource constrained devices such as 
cell phones, PDAs, RFIDs, sensor nodes etc. are the part of IoT. Design process for securing 
these resource constrained devices is guided by factors like small form factor, good 
performance, low energy consumption, and robustness to attacks. These design constraints 
forces us to think of integrating the security features right in to the hardware and software 
parts of the devices which is also called as embedded security. The research concentrates on 
embedded security in perspective of software approaches. The IoT system become prone to 
different security attack, out of all that system is more prone to jamming attack. The goal of 
research is to design the embedded security framework for IoT and to model the jamming 
attack and design the defensive technique for Wireless Sensor Network (WSN)-based IoT.  
The first part of the thesis proposes the embedded security framework for IoT. The 
research gives a detailed survey and analysis of embedded security especially in the area of 
IoT and proposes the security model and threat taxonomy for IoT. The research also 
highlights the need to provide in-built security in the device itself to provide a flexible 
infrastructure for dynamic prevention, detection, diagnosis, isolation, and countermeasures 
against successful breaches. The research proposes the embedded security framework as a 
feature of software/hardware co-design methodology.  
The security framework for IoT also proposes the AES-GCM-based security protocol. The 
proposed protocol is divided into two components: first is the creation of capability and 
second component is an application of AES–GCM. AES-GCM is one of the latest 
authenticated encryption algorithms which provides both message encryption and 
authentication and can be a good option which will be suited for IoT. AES-GCM core uses a 
binary Galois Field Multiplier (GFM) for authentication; together with a high-performance 
AES counter mode cipher to provide high-speed encryption.  
The next part of research addresses jamming attack, which is one of the most destructive 
security attack in the WSN-based IoT. Jamming attack jams the traffic in network by 
blocking the channel. The different kinds of jamming attack are modelled using unified 
modelling language (UML). The thesis uses the sequential- and activity- modelling UML 
approaches to model the behaviour of the jamming attacks. The behavioural modelling and 
analysis of jamming attack in realistic situations (e.g. sensing in industrial application by 
following all network rules), gives the clear understanding of jamming attack execution. The 
research also evaluated the different jamming attack under realistic situations and forms the 
guidelines to design the countermeasure for jamming attack. The analysis of jamming attack 
gives the possibility of new kind of jamming attack inside cluster-based network.  
The research defines the novel threshold-based countermeasure for reactive jamming 
attack. The threshold-based jamming countermeasure (TJC) allows the attack into the 
network and starts its defensive mechanism once it detects the assaults in a network. It uses 
threshold based mechanism to detect the attack and to cure it. It first detects the jamming 
node, then informs all neighbouring node about jammer node. The simulation results show 
that TJC perform in better manner in existence of reactive jamming attack. It demonstrates 
good performance of TJC by varying traffic interval and number of malicious nodes in 
 
 
network. The TJC algorithm is further modified for cluster-based intelligent jamming attack. 
It also shows good performance under the presence of jamming attack. 
The research proposes the game-theory- based countermeasure for detecting different kind 
of jamming attacks in the network. First, the jamming game is modelled to understand the 
different moves during attack and non-attack conditions. The game theoretic solution is 
developed by understanding the game moves. The solution uses the different cross-layer 
features to design the countermeasures. The proposed detection mechanism shows better 
energy consumption, throughput, and delay in different realistic situations of network (e.g. 
varying- amount of traffic and number of malicious nodes) as compared to state-of-art 
solutions. 
The research also contributes in key-management algorithm by proposing cluster-based 
key management algorithm. The algorithm focused on the management and maintenance of 
keys under cluster based mobile WSN network. The scheme consider two phases, first for 
key maintenance which establish the two private keys, home key for own cluster and foreign 
key when node moves from one cluster to another. The second phase maintain the keys when 
cluster head (CH) moves from one cluster to another. The proposed algorithm improves the 
efficiency of key management algorithm in terms of security, mobility, energy efficiency, and 
scalability of network. The simulation of scheme in different realistic situation shows that 
proposed solution shows less computational overheads, energy consumption, and delay as 
compared with state-of-art solution. 
 The outcome for PhD thesis is proposal for, 
 IoT embedded security framework 
 IoT threat taxonomy. 
 Modelling of jamming attack and proposal for new kind of jamming attack 
 Threshold-based countermeasure to detect reactive- and intelligent CH jamming 
attack. 
 Game-theory-based countermeasure for detecting jamming attack by using cross-
layer features. 
 Efficient key management algorithm for managing the keys under cluster-based 
mobile WSN network. 
 In summary, this thesis addresses many important topics of embedded security with 
special focus on jamming attack detection and defence mechanism and on novel key 
management for mobile cluster-based WSN. The framework, methods, and techniques 
proposed in this thesis are, for the most part, applicable to the IoT networks and ubiquitous 
computing.   
Keywords: Embedded security, Internet of Things, Security, Privacy, Wireless sensor 
networks (WSNs), behavioral modelling, activity modelling, sequential modelling, security 
attacks, Jamming attacks, media access control (MAC), game Theory, cluster, key 
management, mobility. 
 
  
 
 
Abstrakt 
Tingenes Internet (IoT) består af milliarder af mennesker, ting og tjenester med potentiale til 
at interagere med hinanden og deres omgivelser. Denne stærkt indbyrdes forbundne globale 
netværksstruktur præsenterer nye typer af udfordringer fra en sikkerhed, tillid og personlige 
perspektiv. Derfor vil sikkerhed for IoT være en kritisk bekymring, der skal løses for at 
aktivere flere aktuelle og fremtidige programmer. Ressourcen begrænset enheder såsom 
mobiltelefoner, PDA'er, RFID, sensor noder etc. er del af tingenes internet. Designproces for 
at sikre disse resource begrænset enheder er styret af faktorer som lille formfaktor, god 
ydeevne, lavt energiforbrug og robusthed til angreb. Disse design begrænsninger tvinger os til 
at tænke på at integrere sikkerhed funktioner ret i til hardware og software delene af 
enhederne, som kaldes også som integreret sikkerhed. Forskningen koncentrerer sig om 
integreret sikkerhed i perspektiv af software tilgange. IoT systemet blive udsat for forskellige 
sikkerhed angreb, ud af al denne ordning er mere udsat for jamming angreb. Målet med 
forskningen er design integreret sikkerhed rammerne for IoT og model jamming angreb og 
design den defensive teknik for trådløs Sensor netværk WSN-baserede IoT. 
Den første del af afhandlingen foreslår integreret sikkerhedsramme for IoT. Forskningen 
giver en detaljeret undersøgelse og analyse af integreret sikkerhed især i området af tingenes 
internet og foreslår sikkerhed model og trussel taksonomien for IoT. Forskningen fremhæver 
også behovet for at levere indbygget sikkerhed i selve enheden til at levere en fleksibel 
infrastruktur for dynamisk forebyggelse, opdagelse, diagnose, isolation og 
modforanstaltninger mod vellykket overtrædelser. Forskningen foreslår integreret 
sikkerhedsramme som en funktion af software/hardware Co design metode. 
Sikkerhedsmiljøet for IoT foreslår også en AES-GCM-baserede sikkerhedsprotokol. Den 
foreslåede protokol er opdelt i to komponenter: først er oprettelsen af kapacitet og anden 
komponent er en anvendelse af AES-GCM. AES-GCM er en af de nyeste godkendte 
krypteringsalgoritmer, der giver både besked kryptering og godkendelse og kan være en god 
mulighed, som vil være egnet til IoT. AES-GCM core bruger en binær Galois felt 
multiplikator (Feltmarskal) til godkendelse; sammen med en højtydende AES counter tilstand 
cipher at levere højhastigheds kryptering. 
Den næste del af forskning adresser jamming angreb, som er en af de mest destruktive 
sikkerhed angreb i de WSN-baserede IoT. Jamming angreb syltetøj trafikken i netværket ved 
at blokere kanalen. De forskellige former for jamming angreb er modelleret ved hjælp af 
unified modelling language (UML). Afhandlingen bruger de sekventielle - og aktivitet - 
modellering UML tilgange til model adfærd jamming-angreb. Den adfærdsmæssige 
modellering og analyse af jamming angreb i realistiske situationer (fx sensing i industriel 
anvendelse ved at følge alle netværk regler), giver en klar forståelse af jamming angreb 
udførelse. Forskningen også evalueret forskellige jamming angrebet under realistiske 
situationer og former retningslinjer til at designe modtræk til jamming angreb. Analyse af 
jamming angreb giver mulighed for nye slags jamming angreb inde klynge-baseret netværk. 
Forskningen definerer den roman tærskel-baserede modtræk til reaktiv jamming angreb. 
Den tærskel-baserede jamming modforanstaltning (TJC) giver mulighed for angrebet ind i 
netværket og starter sin defensive ordning, når det registrerer angrebene i et netværk. Det 
 
 
bruger tærskel baseret mekanisme til at registrere angreb og helbrede den. Det første 
registrerer noden jamming, så oplyser alle tilstødende node om jammer node. Simuleringen 
resultaterne viser, at TJC udfører i bedre måde i eksistensen af reaktive jamming angreb. Det 
viser gode resultater af TJC af varierende trafik interval og antallet af ondsindede noder i 
netværk. TJC algoritme er yderligere ændret til klynge-baserede intelligente jamming angreb. 
Det viser også gode resultater under tilstedeværelse af jamming angreb. 
Forskningen foreslår spillet-teori-baserede modtræk til påvisning af forskellige slags 
jamming angreb i netværket. Først, jamming spillet er modelleret til at forstå de forskellige 
bevægelser under angreb og ikke-angreb betingelser. De spil teoretisk løsning er udviklet af 
forståelse spillet flytter. Løsningen bruger forskellige cross-lag til at designe 
modforanstaltningerne. Den foreslåede detection mekanisme viser bedre energiforbrug, 
overførselshastighed og forsinkelse i forskellige realistiske situationer af netværk (f.eks. 
varierende mængde af trafik og antallet af ondsindede noder) i forhold til state-of-art 
løsninger. 
Forskningen bidrager også i nøgleadministration algoritme ved at foreslå klynge-baserede 
nøglehåndtering algoritme. Algoritmen fokuseret på forvaltning og vedligeholdelse af 
nøglerne under klynge baseret ambulant WSN netværk. Ordningen overveje to faser, først til 
central vedligeholdelse, der etablerer to private nøgler, starttasten for egen klynge og 
fremmed nøgle når node flytter fra én klynge til en anden. Den anden fase opretholde 
nøglerne når klynge hovedet (CH) bevæger sig fra én klynge til en anden. Den foreslåede 
algoritme forbedrer effektiviteten af nøglehåndtering algoritme med hensyn til sikkerhed, 
mobilitet, energieffektivitet og skalerbarhed af netværk. Simulering af ordningen i forskellige 
realistiske situation viser, at løsningsforslag viser mindre beregningsmæssige overhead, 
energiforbrug og forsinkelse sammenlignet med state-of-art løsning. 
Resultatet for ph.d.-afhandling forslag til, 
 IoT integreret sikkerhedsramme 
 IoT trussel taksonomi 
 Modellering af jamming angreb og forslag til nye slags jamming angreb 
 Tærskel baseret modtræk til at opdage reaktiv- og intelligent CH jamming angreb. 
 Spilteori baseret modtræk til påvisning af jamming angreb ved hjælp af cross-lag 
funktioner. 
 Effektiv nøglehåndtering algoritme til styring af nøgler under klynge-baserede 
mobile WSN netværk. 
I Resumé omhandler denne afhandling mange vigtige emner af integreret sikkerhed med 
særlig fokus på jamming attack detection og forsvar mekanisme og roman nøglehåndtering 
for mobile klynge-baseret WSN. Ramme, metoder og teknikker, der foreslås i denne 
afhandling er for det meste gælder for tingenes internet netværk og allestedsnærværende 
computing. 
Nøgleord: Integreret sikkerhed, tingenes Internet, sikkerhed, privatliv, trådløs sensornetværk 
(WSNs), adfærdsmæssige modellering, aktivitet modellering, sekventiel modellering, 
sikkerhed angreb, Jamming angreb, media access control (MAC), spilteori, klynge, 
nøglehåndtering, mobilitet. 
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1  
Introduction 
 
The goal of this chapter is to explain the motivation, challenges and 
security requirements for Internet of Things (IoT). Key issues and 
milestones for different security architectures are explained in order 
to get the synopsis of the thesis. Goals and objects of research are 
elucidated in this chapter. The scientific contributions of this thesis 
are explained, and the details of related publications are provided. 
Finally, the outline of the thesis is provided to give an overview of the 
individual chapters.  
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1.1 Introduction 
 
The Internet has undergone severe changes since its first launch in the late 1960s as an 
outcome of the ARPANET with number of users about 20% of the world population. “7 
trillion wireless devices serving 7 billion people in 2017”. This vision reflects the increasing 
trend of introducing micro devices and tools in future. The Future of internet i.e. Internet of 
Things(IoT) will pervade all aspects of our lives, capturing, storing, and communicating a 
wide range of sensitive and personal data anywhere anytime. With the objectives of IoT, all 
objects will be able to exchange information and, if necessary actively process information 
according to predefined schemes, which may or may not be deterministic. In such ambient 
environment not only user become ubiquitous but also devices and their context become 
transparent and ubiquitous. With the miniaturization of devices, increase of computational 
power, and reduction of energy consumption, this trend will continue towards IoT[1]. 
 
 
Figure 1.1: IoT Pillars 
Figure 1.1 shows the house for IoT which is build from all the components required for 
communication and connectivity. Communication, data processing, identification, 
localization and storage will be the pillars for IoT which will enable any-to-any and anywhere 
connectivity. Security, Sensor device and network planning will be the base on which the 
pillars of IoT will reside. IoT will connect things to users, business and to other things using 
combination of wired and wireless connectivity. The effectiveness and efficiency of these 
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systems will be important and crucial which will enable new forms of connectivity which 
should be inexpensive with support to standard Internet protocols. Most of the devices in the 
IoT will be used in two broad areas: 
1. Critical Infrastructure: power production/generation/distribution, manufacturing, 
transportation, etc. 
2. Personal infrastructure: personal medical devices, automobiles, home entertainment 
and device control, retail, etc. 
Critical infrastructure represents an attractive target for national and industrial espionage, 
denial of service and other disruptive attacks. Internet connected things that touch very 
sensitive personal information is the high priority targets for cyber criminals, identity theft 
and fraud. Both these areas will demand new technology requiring new approaches to 
security and a major change in the way security is architected, delivered and monitored. 
IoT will demand new approaches to security like a secure lightweight operating system, 
scalable approaches to continuous monitoring and threat mitigation, and new ways of 
detecting and blocking active threats. One of the most challenging topics in such an 
interconnected world of miniaturized systems and sensors are security and privacy aspects. 
Having every ‘thing’ connected to the global future IoT and communication with each other, 
new security and privacy problems arise, e. g., confidentiality, authenticity, and integrity of 
data sensed and exchanged by ‘things’. Due to manifold aspects that involves, security for 
IoT will be a critical concern that must be addressed in order to enable several current and 
future applications [2,3]. 
1.2 IoT Scenario and Objectives 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Virtual Shopping Scenario for IoT 
 
Consider a virtual shopping scenario as shown in figure 1.2. Suppose you are at your office, 
and one of your family member demands for a matching sofa set for your hall. Because of 
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office constraints you cannot go to the shopping mall to do the needful. You also do not know 
about the size and color that will best suit your hall. Now to avoid the travelling back home 
and going to the shop, you can just call your home network through your mobile device 
sitting at your office and connect to your home network through different wireless 
technologies. The home network consists of multiple sensors/wireless devices.  You can call 
in your home network and connect to the camera located in the home. You view the hall and 
take a remote picture of the hall from a suitable angle. On similar lines you can connect to the 
network of the shopping mall, and select the item that best suits your hall. After finalizing the 
item, now you do the payment by connecting to the bank and transfer the amount to the 
shopping mall store account. 
 
By using different networks and devices as shown in figure 1.2 we have just left our homes, 
mobile and bank information open to hackers and thieves. Apart from the security present in 
the existing networks, we will have to focus on the security aspects of all the resource 
constrained devices involved in the communications. Existing networks are inadequate to 
meet the security needs of data sensitive applications. Hence in security terms we need to 
identify two areas which need to be secured i.e. network security and device security. 
The IoT scenarios, like individual wireless device interfacing with internet, constellation of 
wireless devices, pervasive system and sensor network, are associated with new network 
service requirements that motivate rethinking of several Internet architecture issues. Several 
mobile/wireless features may require mechanisms that cannot be implemented through the 
conventional IP framework for the Internet, or if they can, may suffer from performance 
degradation due to the additional overhead associated with network protocols that were 
originally designed for static infrastructure computing [3]. We therefore discuss a set of 
objectives related to the networking requirements of the representative IoT scenarios 
identified earlier. Figure 1.3 shows the IoT Objectives followed by their description. 
 
Figure 1.3:  IoT Objectives 
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1. Naming and Addressing 
Today’s Internet addressing scheme is rather rigid; it is well suited to a static, hierarchical 
topology structure. It provides a very efficient way to label (and find) each device interface in 
this hierarchy. To support mobility and routing, the next generation Internet must provide 
ways to name and route to a much richer set of network elements than just attachment points. 
A clean architectural separation between name and routable address is a critical requirement 
for IoT[4,5]. 
 
2. Device Discovery and Network Discovery 
The current Internet is text-dominated with relatively efficient search engines for discovering 
textual resources with manual configuration. An Internet dominated by unstructured 
information supplied from large numbers of sensor devices must support efficient 
mechanisms for discovering available sensor resources. The new architecture must support 
methods for the registration of a new sensor system in the broader network [6,7]. 
 
3. Content and Service access 
A new architecture should provide data cleansing mechanisms that prevent corrupted data 
from propagating through the sensor network. In particular, services that maintain device 
calibration and monitor/detect adversarial manipulation of sensor devices should be 
integrated into sensor networks. This could be realized through obtaining context 
information, metadata, and statistical techniques to locally detect faulty inputs [6,8,9]. 
 
4. Communication 
Wireless devices should be able to operate independently of the broader internet. In 
particular, there may be times during which the connection of a wireless device or, network 
to the internet is not available. During these times, wireless devices should be able to operate 
stably in modes disconnected from the rest of the infrastructure, as well as be able to 
opportunistically establish "local" ad-hoc networks using their own native protocols. In 
particular, this means that issues such as authorization and updating the device state should 
be seamless, with minimal latency [5,9]. 
 
5. Security and Privacy 
Wireless networks can be expected to be the platform of choice for launching a variety of 
attacks targeting the new Internet. At the most basic level, wireless devices will likely have 
evolving naming and addressing schemes and it will be necessary to ensure that the names 
and addresses that are used are verifiable and authenticated. One parameter uniquely 
associated with wireless networks is the notion of location. Location information provided by 
the network should be trustworthy [9]. Additionally the architecture should provision hooks 
for future extensions to accommodate legal regulations. 
1.3 Problem statement 
This section describes the motivation and problem statement along with the hypothesis and 
the methodology. 
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1.3.1 Motivation and Problem Statement 
The Internet of Things (IoT) consists of billions of people, things and services having the 
potential to interact with each other and their environment. This highly interconnected global 
network structure presents new types of challenges from a security, trust and privacy 
perspective. Hence, Security for IoT will be a critical concern that must be addressed in order 
to enable several current and future applications. The resource constrained devices such as 
cell phones, PDAs, RFIDs, sensor nodes etc. are the part of IoT. Design process for securing 
these devices is guided by factors like small form factor, good performance, low energy 
consumption, and robustness to attacks. Following are the challenges which need to be 
tackled in the world of pervasive devices. 
 Management, scalability and heterogeneity of devices  
 Networked knowledge and context 
 Privacy, security and trust will have to be adapted to both devices and information 
This will involve the development of highly efficient cryptographic algorithms and protocols 
that provide basic security properties such as confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity, as 
well as secure implementations for the various kinds of mostly resource constrained devices. 
Embedded security is growing as a new dimension for resource constrained devices which 
will integrate the security features right in to the hardware and software parts of the devices. 
The research concentrates on embedded security in perspective of software services. The IoT 
system become prone to different security attack, out of all that, system is more prone to 
jamming attack.  
The main goal of the research is to design the embedded security framework for IoT and 
design the security solutions to save from different jamming attacks and perform efficient key 
management in cluster based WSN. 
To meet above challenges, the main research problem is divided into following sub problems, 
 Propose the embedded security framework for IoT: The research gives a detailed 
survey and analysis of embedded security especially in the area of IoT and proposes 
the security model and threat taxonomy for IoT. The research also highlights the need 
to provide in-built security in the device itself to provide a flexible infrastructure for 
dynamic prevention, detection, diagnosis, isolation, and countermeasures against 
successful breaches. The research proposes the embedded security framework as a 
feature of software/hardware co-design methodology. 
 Modelling of Jamming attacks and to design efficient defense mechanism against 
jamming attacks: The research modelled the different kinds of jamming attack using 
sequential and activity modelling, and proposed the different countermeasures to save 
from jamming attack. The research also proposed the new kind of jamming attack for 
cluster based network and suggested the solution for it.    
 To specify and design optimized secure key management for WSN: The research 
proposes the optimized key management for cluster-based WSN by considering 
mobility of the nodes and cluster head (CH). 
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1.3.2 Hypothesis 
It is hypothesized that the Threat Taxonomy for IoT, jamming attack modelling, jamming 
attack detection, defence mechanisms, and efficient key management will constitute the 
security framework for IoT. The research divides the main hypothesis into small hypothesis. 
It is hypothesized that the proposal for embedded security protocol takes into consideration 
the resource constraints of IoT devices i.e. battery life, processing power and computation 
time. The new threat taxonomy will identify the level of threats, to find mitigation on it. 
Modelling of jamming attack using UML based modelling is used to understand the 
behaviour of attack. Evaluation of jamming attack and new different possible attack on 
cluster based network is proposed. Threshold based and game theory based solutions to 
identify and mitigate the jamming attack is developed for cluster-based WSN. The key 
management solution is developed for cluster-based WSN by considering mobility in the 
network. 
A comprehensive hypothesis comprises:   
A. It is hypothesized that, the proposed threat taxonomy for IoT  will address the security 
requirements in broader aspect and will be helpful for framing the security framework 
for IoT which takes into consideration  the  resource constraints of devices of IoT. 
B. It is hypothesized that the proposed mutual authentication process based on AES-
GCM will improve resistance to attack and efficiency of network in presence of 
attacks. 
C. It is hypothesized that, the modelling of jamming attacks using UML approach gives 
the clear understanding of attack penetration and it will be useful for developing 
solution on jamming attack. It is also hypothesized that the modelling of jamming 
attack gives the notion to propose new possibility of attacks. The evaluation of 
jamming attack is performed by considering varying traffic rate and number of 
malicious nodes in the network. 
D. Using the proposed threshold-based jamming countermeasure, it is hypothesized that 
the reactive jamming attack can be detected and mitigated, to enhance the security. It 
is also hypothesized that the approach considered will be efficient in realistic network 
conditions.  
E. The game theory based solution for jamming detection and mitigation hypothesize 
that the cross-layer features will be useful to take secure moves during jamming 
game. It is also hypothesized that the proposed solution will be energy and delay 
efficient as compared with state-of-art solutions. 
F. The last hypothesis is that the key management technique will help to build a more 
strong security framework but it should be modified according to current need of 
applications. The key management technique is developed by considering the 
mobility conditions of network for Mobile Cluster-Based WSN. The key management 
technique should require less communication and computation cost while managing 
the key. 
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The hypothesis addresses the consideration and assumption made for developing the secure 
framework and jamming detection for IoT. Therefore, dissertation work gives answers to the 
following questions through this research:  
1. What is need of security framework for IoT? 
2. How the threat taxonomy helps to address the level of threat? 
3. What is need of attack modelling? How to do it? How it helps to develop attack 
detection and mitigation techniques? 
4. Will the threshold-based decision lead to correct detection of attack? 
5. Will the cross-layer features help to improve security decisions? 
6. How the lightweight and efficient framework can be develop and applied to IoT 
security? 
7. Will the proposed set of solutions help to make IoT secure against jamming attack? 
8. How key management should be addressed in mobile Cluster-based WSN scenarios? 
1.3.3 Methodology 
The current research problem is divided into three phases as described in the problem 
statement. The understanding and conclusions of each phase has given motivation to address 
the next phase in better manner. The first phase of research is to develop the security 
framework and architecture for IoT performance enhancement. The security model and threat 
taxonomy for IoT is developed by understanding the available literature in the field. The 
defined threat taxonomy in research had motivated to extend the work in jamming attack, 
which is one of the disastrous attacks on WSN. The research had taken the understanding of 
the currently available approaches for jamming attacks and defined more simpler and 
understandable models for the jamming attacks. The research modelled the jamming attacks 
using activity- and sequential- modelling techniques. The research also defined the game 
theoretic model for playing a different kind of jamming game and given the secure moves to 
detect and avoid jamming situations in the network. In the last phase of research, the secure 
key management is developed for mobile nodes. The research is motivated from the current 
literature in secure key management where very few work addressed the management of keys 
under mobile environment. The research proposed the efficient key management technique 
under mobility and compared it with state-of-art available solution. The performance of each 
phase task is evaluated by using theory assisted designs and comparative simulation using 
widely used simulation tools in research community. The comparative simulations in thesis 
are performed by using NS-2 simulator, which is widely used simulator in the research 
community. The research mainly considers the energy efficiency, computational overheads, 
delay and throughput of system by varying the number of nodes, number of malicious nodes 
and traffic interval, which shows the correct efficiency and scalability of system. All the 
simulations of given solution are performed by considering IEEE 802.15.4 radio model. IEEE 
802.15.4 is good for time-critical low power WSN. The research developed is majorly 
concentrating on industrial, home, and health applications of WSN. All these applications 
majorly considers low rate wireless personal area network (Low-WPAN).   
Chapter 1  Introduction 
14 
 
1.4 Security Architectures  
 
1.4.1 Security Frameworks 
Security framework for IoT will mainly include architectures for providing and managing 
access control, authentication, and authorization. It will provide methods for controlling the 
identification and authentication of users and for administering which authenticated users are 
granted access to protected resources. Some of the existing frameworks described can be used 
to provide several functions as shown in Table 1.1. 
Table 1.1 State of Art Evaluation 
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1 PKI[10] √     
2 PGP[11] √     
3 Kerberos[12]  √    
4 Windows Live ID[13]  √  √  
5 OpenID[14]  √  √  
6 Liberty Alliance[15]  √ √ √  
7 WS-Federation[16]  √ √   
 
1. Identity Certificate Frameworks 
These frameworks allow users without prior contact to authenticate to each other and 
digitally sign and encrypt messages. They are based on identity certificates, which are 
certificates that bind a public key to an identity. Examples of identity certificate frameworks 
include Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs), and Pretty Good Privacy (PGP). 
 
2. Single Sign-on 
Single sign-on (SSO) allows users to be authenticated only once in a system. Users can then 
access all resources for which they have access permission without entering multiple 
passwords. Example of SSO frameworks include:  
Kerberos: a distributed authentication service, which provides SSO within a single 
administrative domain.  
Windows Live ID: an Internet-based SSO framework used by Microsoft applications and web 
services such as MSN messenger.  
OpenID: an authentication framework that allows users to login to different web sites using a 
single digital identity, eliminating the need to have different usernames and passwords for 
each site. 
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Liberty Alliance: a consortium that aims to establish open standards, guidelines and best 
practices for federated identity management.  
WS-Federation: a federated identity standard developed by Microsoft, IBM, VeriSign, BEA 
and RSA Security, which forms part of the Web Services Security framework. 
 
3. Identity Federation 
Federated Identity allows users of one security domain to securely access resources on 
another security domain, without the need for another user account. Users register with an 
authentication server in their own domain and other domains trust its assertions. 
 
4. User-centric identity management 
User-centric identity management is a design principle that focuses on usability and cost-
effectiveness from the user’s point of view. There are three main approaches to user-centric 
identity management that are managing multiple identities e.g. information cards [15], giving 
users a single identity e.g. OpenID and, lastly giving users control over access to their 
resources. 
 
5. Device Security 
The Device Security Framework includes device-resident security software as well as 
security capabilities delivered across the network. The device-resident software is embedded 
into devices at the time of manufacture. In order to provide security at the physical or 
execution level, we need to build our security solution based on secure execution 
environment (SEE). In this respect, Trusted Platform Module (TPM) by Atmel [17] and 
Trustzone by ARM [18] have done good amount of development in embedded platform 
security. 
 
1.4.2 Key Properties of IoT 
There are a number of key properties of IoT that create several issues for security and raises 
additional requirements for security[19]. These key properties are listed below: 
Mobility: IoT devices are mobile and often generally connected to the Internet via a large set 
of providers.  
Wireless: These devices typically connect to the rest of the Internet via a wide range of 
wireless links, including Bluetooth, 802.11, WiMAX, Zigbee and GSM/UMTS. With 
wireless communications, any nearby observer can intercept unique low-level identifiers that 
are sent in the clear, e.g., Bluetooth and 802.11 device addresses.  
Embedded Use:  Major IoT devices have a single use (e.g., blood pressure or heart monitors 
and household appliances). As a result, the detection of communication patterns unique to a 
specialized device allows users to be profiled[12]. 
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Diversity: These devices span a range of computational abilities from full-fledged PCs to 
low-end RFID tags. Privacy designs must accommodate even the simplest of devices. 
Scale: These devices are convenient, growing in number daily, and increasingly embed 
network connectivity into everyday settings. This makes it difficult for users to monitor 
privacy concerns. 
1.4.3 High level security requirements 
In business process, security requirements are described as shown in figure 1.4. 
 
Figure 1.4:  High level Security Requirements for IoT 
Resilience to attacks: The system has to avoid single points of failure and should adjust itself 
to node failures. 
Data authentication: As a principle, retrieved address and object information must be 
authenticated. 
Access control: Information providers must be able to implement access control on the data 
provided. 
Client privacy: Measures need to be taken that only the information provider is able to infer 
from observing the use of the lookup system, related to a specific customer; at least, inference 
should be very hard to conduct. 
User identification: It refers to the process of validating users before allowing them to use 
the system. 
Secure storage: This involves confidentiality and integrity of sensitive information stored in 
the system. 
Identity Management: It is broad administrative area that deals with identifying individuals / 
things in a system and controlling their access to resources within that system by associating 
user rights and restrictions with the established identity. 
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Secure data communication: It includes authenticating communicating peers, ensuring 
confidentiality and integrity of communicated data, preventing repudiation of a 
communication transaction, and protecting the identity of communicating entities. 
Availability: Availability refers to ensuring that unauthorized persons or systems cannot deny 
access or use to authorized users. 
Secure network access: This provides a network connection or service access only if the 
device is authorized. 
Secure content: Content security or Digital Rights Management (DRM) protects the rights of 
the digital content used in the system. 
Secure execution environment: It refers to a secure, managed-code, runtime environment 
designed to protect against deviant applications. 
Tamper resistance: It refers to the desire to maintain these security requirements even when 
the device falls into the hands of malicious parties, and can be physically or logically probed. 
1.5 Security Model and Threat Taxonomy for IoT 
This section presents the attack classification for IoT, identifies the threat taxonomy for 
IoT and based on the key properties and challenges proposes a cube structure security model 
for IoT.  
 
1.5.1 Security attacks on IoT 
The domain of security attacks on embedded device is increasing day by day. Following 
Figure 1.5 summarizes the attacks on IoT Systems [20-22]. 
 
1. Physical attacks 
These types of attacks tamper with the hardware components and are relatively harder to 
perform because it requires expensive material. Some examples are de-packaging of chip, 
layout reconstruction, micro-probing, particle beam techniques, etc. 
 
2. Side channel attacks 
These attacks are based on “side channel Information” that can be retrieved from the 
encryption device that is neither the plaintext to be encrypted nor the ciphertext resulting 
from the encryption process. Encryption devices produce timing information that is easily 
measurable, radiation of various sorts, power consumption statistics, and more. Side channel 
attacks makes use of some or all of this information to recover the key the device is using. It 
is based on the fact that logic operations have physical characteristics that depend on the 
input data. Examples of side channel attacks are timing attacks, power analysis attacks, fault 
analysis attacks, electromagnetic attacks and environmental attacks. 
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Figure 1.5:  Attacks on IoT Devices 
 
3. Cryptanalysis attacks 
These attacks are focused on the ciphertext and they try to break the encryption, i.e. find the 
encryption key to obtain the plaintext. Examples of cryptanalysis attacks include ciphertext-
only attack, known-plaintext attack, chosen-plaintext attack, man-in-the-middle attack, etc.  
 
4. Software attacks 
Software attacks are the major source of security vulnerabilities in any system. Software 
attacks exploit implementation vulnerabilities in the system through its own communication 
interface. This kind of attack includes exploiting buffer overflows and using trojan horse 
programs, worms or viruses to deliberately inject malicious code into the system. Jamming 
attack is the one of the ruinous invasion which blocks the channel by introducing larger 
amount of noise packets in a network. Jamming is the biggest threat to IoT where a network 
consists of small nodes with limited energy and computing resources. So it is very difficult to 
adopt the conventional anti jamming methods to implement over IoT. 
 
5. Network Attacks 
Wireless communications systems are vulnerable to network security attacks due to the 
broadcast nature of the transmission medium. Basically attacks are classified as active and 
passive attacks. Examples of passive attacks include monitor and eavesdropping, Traffic 
analysis, camouflage adversaries, etc. Examples of active attacks include denial of service 
attacks, node subversion, node malfunction, node capture, node outage, message corruption, 
false node, routing attacks, etc 
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1.5.2 Threat Taxonomy for IoT 
IoT is coupled with new security threats and alters overall information security risk profile. 
Although the implementation of technological solutions may respond to IoT threats and 
vulnerabilities, security for IoT is primarily a management issue. Effective management of 
the threats associated with IoT requires a sound and thorough assessment of risk given the 
environment and development of a plan to mitigate identified threats [23]. Figure 1.6 presents 
threat taxonomy to understand and assess the various threats associated with the use of IoT.  
 
Figure 1.6: Threat Taxonomy for IoT 
Identification covers determination of unique device/user/session with authentication, 
authorization, accounting and provisioning.  
Communication threats covers a denial-of-service attack (DoS) and it occurs  when an 
attacker continually bombards a targeted AP (Access Point) or network with bogus requests, 
premature successful  connection messages, failure messages, and/or other commands.  
Physical threat includes micro probing and reverse engineering causing serious security 
problem by directly tampering the hardware components. Some types of physical attack 
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require expensive material because of which they are relatively hard to perform. Some 
examples are: de-packaging of chip, layout reconstruction, micro-probing. 
Embedded security threat model will span all the threats at physical and MAC layer. 
Security threats like device and data tampering, side channel analysis, bus monitoring, etc 
will be the concerns at device level. 
Storage management has crucial impact on the key management to achieve confidentiality 
and integrity. We must also be careful in choosing which cryptographic components to use as 
the building blocks since, for example, the cipher texts for some public key encryption 
schemes can reveal identifying information about the intended recipient.  
1.5.3 Security Model for IoT 
The different possible attacks on IoT and the threat taxonomy give new challenges to security 
and privacy in end to end communication of things. Protection of data and privacy of things 
is one of the key challenges in the IoT. Lack of security measures will result in decreased 
adoption among users and therefore is one of the driving factors in the success of the IoT[24-
27]. Figure 1.7 depicts the cube structure model for IoT.  
 
Figure 1.7: Security Model for IoT 
Integrated and interrelated perspective on security, trust, privacy can potentially deliver an 
input to address protection issues in the IoT. Therefore, we have chosen a cube structure as a 
modelling mechanism for security, trust, and privacy in the IoT. A cube has three dimensions 
with the ability to clearly show the intersection thereof. Therefore, a cube is an ideal 
modelling structure for depicting the convergence of security, trust, and privacy for the IoT. 
In IoT access information, required to grant/reject access requests, is not only complex but 
also composite in nature. This is a direct result of the high level of interconnectedness 
between things, services, and people. It is clear that the type and structure of information 
required to grant/reject such an access request is complex and should address the following 
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IoT issues: security (authorization), trust (reputation), and privacy (respondent). The 
incremental deployment of the technologies that will make up the IoT must therefore provide 
adequate security and privacy mechanisms from the start. We must be sure that adequate 
security and privacy is available before the technology gets deployed and becomes part of our 
daily live. 
1.6 Novelty and Contributions  
 
Figure 1.8: Problem Evolution and Thesis Contribution 
The goal of this thesis is to design the security framework for IoT and design the security 
solutions to save from different jamming attacks and perform efficient key management in 
cluster based WSN. Major factors of influence are the energy consumption, delay, throughput 
and computational overheads for resource constrained devices in IoT. This study contributes 
to find out efficient attack detection and defense mechanism for jamming attack, which is the 
biggest threat in IoT. The thesis compares the performance evaluation of the proposed 
techniques with the existing state of art solution. The thesis also provides a novel key 
management scheme for cluster based mobile WSNs. Figure 1.8 provides an overview of the 
contributions presented in this thesis. The major contributions of thesis are as follows, 
 Threat taxonomy for IoT 
 Security model for IoT 
 Security framework for IoT 
 Jamming attack modelling 
 Intelligent cluster head jamming attack 
 Attack detection and defence mechanism against jamming attack 
 Key management for cluster-based WSN 
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1. Threat Taxonomy for IoT 
In this contribution of thesis the attack classification and threat taxonomy for IoT is proposed 
which will help to build the security framework for IoT. Security assessment for IoT is a 
tough problem, and attack classification and threat taxonomies will definitely aid in this 
process. The attack classification and threat taxonomy for IoT will be used as a framework 
for systematically examining new systems for similar but as yet unknown vulnerabilities. 
This Taxonomy relates to the needs of security model developers and will provide a more 
useful information tool for security analysts[28]. 
2. Security model for IoT 
In this contribution, a cube structure security model for IoT is proposed which is derived 
from the key properties, challenges, attack classification and threat taxonomy for IoT. The 
IoT is an entirely new way of building out networks and services, so there is a need for a new 
security model for IoT which will take into considerations the security requirements and 
resource constraints of IoT. The security model organizes the security requirements and will 
help to propose an efficient protocol suitable for future internet[28-29].  
3. Security Framework for IoT 
In this contribution of thesis the design issues and the need of a different security 
framework for IoT which will take into consideration the limitations of resource constrained 
devices is analysed and structured. The challenges for embedded security framework are 
addressed and an enhanced security framework is proposed. The thesis also proposes the 
AES-GCM based embedded security protocol. Authenticated encryption is best suited 
concept for IoT that will provide both message encryption and authentication. Unique part of 
AES-GCM work is a novel approach of extending authentication and encryption with 
cryptographic capabilities[29,30]. 
 
4. Jamming Attack Modelling and Evaluation 
In this contribution of thesis behaviour of different types of jamming attack are modelled 
using sequential and activity modelling approaches under unified modelling language 
(UML). The different types of jamming attacks consider here is constant-, deceptive-, 
random- and reactive- jamming. The behavioural modelling of these jamming attacks gives 
the clear understanding of jamming attack execution in the network, and it is useful tool to 
develop the defensive mechanism on it. The contribution also analysed the performance of 
the different jamming attack under varying network situations such as packet interval and 
number of malicious nodes in the network. The performance criteria measured here are delay, 
throughput and energy consumption[31,32]. 
5. Intelligent Cluster Head Jamming Attack 
The thesis proposed the new kind of attack on cluster-based IoT network i.e. intelligent 
cluster head (CH) jamming attack. It is kind of reactive jamming attack, which mainly targets 
the CH. The attack is destructive because it attacks on CH, which is aggregating information 
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coming from other nodes in cluster and forwarding it to next CH or BS on path. The research 
also measured the performance of intelligent CH jamming attack with normal reactive attack. 
The result shows that intelligent CH jamming attack is more destructive as compared with 
normal reactive jamming attack[33]. 
6. Attack Detection and Defence Mechanism for Jamming Attack 
The research developed the three different contributions under this title. The first contribution 
is development of the new countermeasure for reactive jamming attack. It suggests the 
Threshold based Jamming Countermeasure (TJC), which detects the jamming in network 
based on specific threshold value stored in the network. The simulation of TJC under 
different realistic situations shows that, the TJC helps to countermeasure the reactive 
jamming attack. The performance of TJC is measured by varying traffic interval, number of 
malicious nodes under static and mobile scenarios.  
The second contribution is development of game theoretic modelling of jamming attack and 
detection mechanism. The jamming attack is modelled using game theory to understand 
different strategies of jammer in better manner. The new detection mechanism is developed 
to save from different jamming attack using cross-layer features. The proposed detection 
mechanism shows good energy consumption, throughput, and delay in different realistic 
situations of network. Its performance is compared with state-of-art optimal solutions on 
jamming. 
The last contribution is to develop the countermeasure against intelligent CH jamming attack. 
The countermeasure is developed by modifying the TJC countermeasure for intelligent CH 
jamming attack. The proposed countermeasure is successful to detect and cure the attack 
during both inter- and intra- cluster communication [33,34].     
7. Key Management for Cluster-based WSN 
In this contribution of thesis new key management technique is developed for cluster-based 
WSN by considering mobility in the network. The scheme considers the two phases for 
managing the keys i.e. key establishment and key maintenance. The proposed algorithm 
improves the efficiency of key management algorithm in terms of security, mobility, energy 
efficiency and scalability of network. The simulation of scheme in different realistic situation 
shows that proposed solution shows less computational overheads, energy consumption and 
delay as compared with state-of-art solution [35]. 
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1.7 Publications  
 
The contributions have been, or are in the process of being, validated through peer-review 
and publication in journal and conference proceedings. The relevant publications are listed 
below: 
 
A. Journal Publications 
 
1. Sachin D. Babar, Neeli R. Prasad, Ramjee Prasad, "Activity Modelling and 
Countermeasures on Jamming Attack", Journal of Cyber Security and Mobility, 
Vol. 2, Issue no. 2, pp. 1-27, April 2013. 
2. Sachin D. Babar, Neeli R. Prasad, Ramjee Prasad, "CMKMS: Cluster based 
Mobile Key Management Scheme for Wireless Sensor Network", International 
Journal of Pervasive computing and Communications (IJPCC) : Special Issue on 
Adaptive Security for IoT, Vol. 10, Issue 2, pp-196-211, April 2014. 
3. Sachin Babar, Parikshit N Mahalle, Neeli R. Prasad and Ramjee Prasad, “A Hash 
Key-based Key Management Mechanism for Cluster-based Wireless Sensor 
Network”, Journal of Information Security and Applications, Elsevier editorial 
system. (Submitted) 
 
B. Conference Publications  
 
1. Sachin Babar, Parikshit N. Mahalle, Antonietta Stango, Neeli R Prasad and Ramjee 
Prasad, “Proposed Security Model and Threat Taxonomy for the Internet of 
Things (IoT),” In proceedings of 3rd International Conference CNSA 2010, Book 
titled: Recent Trends in Network Security and Applications - Communications in 
Computer and Information Science, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp. 420 - 429 
Volume: 89. Chennai – India, July 23-25, 2010. 
2. Sachin Babar, Antonietta Stango, Neeli Prasad, Jaydip Sen and Ramjee Prasad, 
"Proposed Embedded Security Framework for Internet of Things (IoT)" , In 
proceedings of 2
nd
  International Conference on Wireless Communications, Vehicular 
Technology, Information Theory and Aerospace & Electronic Systems, Wireless 
VITAE 2011, vol., no., pp.1-5, Feb. 28, 2011 - March 3, 2011. 
3. Sachin Babar, Parikshit N Mahalle, Neeli R. Prasad and Ramjee Prasad, “Proposed 
on Device Capability based Authentication using AES-GCM for Internet of 
Things (IoT),” In proceedings of 3rd International ICST Conference on Security and 
Privacy in Mobile Information and Communication Systems (Mobisec 2011), Aalborg 
– Denmark, May 17-19, 2011. 
4. Sachin D. Babar, Neeli R. Prasad, Ramjee Prasad, "Jamming Attack: Behavioral 
Modelling and Analysis", In proceedings of the 3
rd
 International Conference on 
Wireless Communications, Vehicular Technology, Information Theory and 
Aerospace & Electronic Systems, Wireless VITAE 2013, Princeton, New Jersey, 
USA, June 24-26, 2013. 
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5. Sachin D. Babar, Neeli R. Prasad, Ramjee Prasad, "Proposed Game Theoretic 
Modelling of Jamming Attack and Attack Detection Mechanism” , In proceedings 
of the 16
th
 International Symposium on Wireless Personal Multimedia 
Communications, WPMC 2013,  Atlantic City, New Jersey, USA, June 24 - 27, 2013. 
6. Sachin D. Babar, Neeli R. Prasad, Ramjee Prasad, "Countermeasure for Intelligent 
Cluster-head Jamming Attack in Wireless Sensor Network” , In the proceedings 
of the International Conference on Privacy and Security in Mobile Systems, PRISMS 
2013,  Atlantic City, New Jersey, USA, June 24 - 27, 2013. 
 
C. Other Publications 
 
1. Parikshit N. Mahalle, Sachin Babar, Neeli R Prasad and Ramjee Prasad, “Identity 
Management Framework towards Internet of Things (IoT): Roadmap and Key 
Challenges” In proceedings of 3rd International Conference CNSA 2010, Book titled: 
Recent Trends in Network Security and Applications - Communications in Computer 
and Information Science, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp. 430 - 439 Volume: 89. 
Chennai – India, July 23-25, 2010. 
 
1.8 Thesis Outline 
 
The following provides an outline of the thesis with a brief description of the individual 
chapters. 
 
Chapter 2: Security Framework for IoT Security 
 
This chapter introduces the concept of embedded security, its requirement, embedded 
security issues in IoT, challenges of embedded security framework design and presents 
enhanced embedded security framework. The chapter discusses the environment factor and 
security objectives for enhanced embedded security framework. The chapter also proposed 
the AES-GCM-based embedded security protocol. Authenticated encryption is best suited 
concept for IoT that will provide both message encryption and authentication. Unique part of 
AES-GCM work is a novel approach of extending authentication and encryption with 
cryptographic capabilities. The chapter also evaluates the proposed AES-GCM in terms of its 
mutual authentication process, resistance to attack and efficiency. 
 
Chapter 3: Jamming Attack: Modelling and Evaluation 
 
This chapter introduces the jamming attack that take place at physical layer, and its 
classification in detail. The chapter provides modelling of jamming attack using activity- and 
sequential- modeling approach. The chapter also evaluates the different jamming attack in 
variety of network situations. The chapter proposed new possibility of the jamming attack; 
intelligent cluster-based jamming attack and evaluated the performance impact of cluster-
based jamming attack. The last part of chapter discussed the requirements to design efficient 
defense mechanism against jamming attack. 
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Chapter 4: Defense Mechanism against Jamming Attack 
 
This chapter discusses the classification of jamming countermeasures, comparison of 
available countermeasures and derives the open issues to develop efficient countermeasures. 
Threshold-based Jamming Countermeasure (TJC) is discussed in the chapter with assumption 
made, working mechanism of algorithm and comparative simulation with result discussion. 
The chapter overviews the game theory for WSN security and proposed the game formulation 
for jamming attack. It also proposed the jamming detection mechanism based on game theory 
concept. The proposed game theory-based simulation is compared with state of art solutions. 
The counter measure is developed for the proposed intelligent cluster-based jamming attack 
and it is compared with existing solutions. 
 
Chapter 5: Secure Key Management 
 
This chapter illustrates the classification, comparison of secure key management 
techniques, and gives the requirements to develop the optimized secure key management 
technique. The chapter proposes cluster-based key management algorithm and discusses the 
system model, proposed key management scheme, and its performance evaluation. 
 
Chapter 6: Conclusions and Future Work 
 
This chapter provides the summary of the thesis, and discusses future research work. 
 
 
Figure 1.9: Thesis Organization 
 
Chapter 1  Introduction 
27 
 
Following the research contributions agenda, the rest of this dissertation is divided into 
five self-contained parts as shown in Figure 1.9. An overview of the thesis and the chapter 
wise publications can also be seen from Figure 1.9, which shows the connection between 
individual chapters. [A], [B] , [C] shown in the Figure 1.9 refers to the list of publications 
mentioned in Section 1.6.  
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2 
Security Framework for 
IoT 
 
 
This chapter introduces the concept of embedded security for IoT. In 
this chapter, the embedded security issues and challenges for IoT is 
discussed. This chapter proposes the embedded security framework as 
a feature of software/hardware co-design methodology. The chapter 
also proposes the AES-GCM based embedded security protocol based on 
capability and authenticated encryption process. The chapter also 
evaluates the proposed AES-GCM in terms of its mutual 
authentication process, resistance to attack and efficiency. 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
The IoT will consist of billions of digital devices, people, services and other physical 
objects having the potential to seamlessly connect, interact and exchange information about 
themselves and their environment. This will make our lives simpler through a digital 
environment that will be sensitive, adaptive, and responsive to human needs. It will combine 
the power of universal network connectivity with embedded systems, sensors, and actuators 
in the physical world. This new concept involves objects of our daily life, like clothes, cars, 
shopping carts, which will be able to reveal information about them, interact with each other 
and with the environment. IoT will therefore add an enormous range of new industrial 
opportunities to the software and hardware markets. Due to manifold aspects that involves, 
security for IoT will be a critical concern that must be addressed in order to enable several 
current and future applications [1]. 
Existing solutions cannot result in a complete solution and are often not integrated into the 
entire system. Sometimes these solutions violate the criteria that designers have taken into 
consideration from the beginning. These are subtle points that are not addressed by designers 
who tend to focus mainly on functionality and by companies that tend to focus on short term 
profits. All these reveal the importance of fundamental security solutions and the need for 
applied security. The main technical challenges for IoT will therefore include the design and 
integration of different technologies, as well as providing the necessary degree of security. 
 
Figure 2.1:  Structure of Embedded security 
Embedded security means building security in from the start i.e. security features built into a 
device[2]. Embedded security is nowadays growing as new dimension which designers 
should consider throughout the design process, along with other metrics such as cost, 
performance, and power. Security features like physical tamper resistance, cryptography 
(keys, algorithms), platform (operating system elements) will be the concern for IoT systems. 
Embedded security can also be defined in another form as a new dimension which refers to 
what a device needs, to be part of a distributed computing system. Embedded security equips 
the device with a robust trusted element that serves numerous applications and services such 
as DRM (Digital Rights Management), commerce and device management. It makes security 
transparent to the end-user, improves the performance of the security solution and reduces its 
power consumption.  Figure 2.1 shows the structure of embedded security. Embedded 
security will play its role at hardware level, kernel level and operating system level. A secure 
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kernel will provide secure interface between the operating system and the applications. The 
system architecture will provide a secure runtime execution environment. 
This chapter gives a detailed survey and analysis of embedded security especially in the area 
of IoT. Together with the conventional security solutions, the chapter highlights the need to 
provide in-built security in the device itself to provide a flexible infrastructure for dynamic 
prevention, detection, diagnosis, isolation, and countermeasures against successful breaches. 
Based on this survey and analysis, the chapter defines the security needs taking into account 
computational time, energy consumption, and memory requirements of the devices. This 
chapter proposes the embedded security framework as a feature of software/hardware co-
design methodology. 
The chapter also introduces an authentication and encryption protocol which serves as a proof 
of concept for authenticating device using the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) – 
Galois/ Counter Mode (GCM) as cryptographic primitive. Authenticated encryption is best 
suited concept for IoT that will provide both message encryption and authentication. Unique 
part of this work is a novel approach of extending authentication and encryption with 
cryptographic capabilities. 
 
2.2 Related Works 
 
The security for resource constrained devices always faces contradictories: it should 
provide a high level of security, manage several types of protocols and be flexible enough to 
support rapid evolution of security mechanisms and standards with limited silicon area and 
less energy consumption. The solution selected for security in these devices is always a 
question of trade-off between security, flexibility, performance, power consumption, and 
cost. Existing solutions to these problems are divided into three approaches as shown in 
figure 2.2 : 
i) Software only Approach 
This approach makes use of programmability of embedded general purpose processors for 
performing security operations. This approach reaches the demand in cost and flexibility but 
not in the power consumption and silicon area points of view. This approach sometimes leads 
to overwhelm the processing capacity of the embedded GPP (General purpose processors). 
However, one option to solve this problem is to use an optimized GPP. This means that the 
instruction set architecture of the processor contains some extra specific instructions which 
speed up some algorithm-operations or reduce the memory necessary to these operations. But 
this latest solution is not a global answer: it is efficient only for a limited number of 
algorithms (i.e. these which use the extra instructions). Concerning the parameter 
computation capacity, it can be evaluate more easily but it is generally not optimum. In the 
point of view of countermeasures against security attack, this approach can provide several 
solutions. In [3], a countermeasure against side-channel attack at software level is described. 
ii) Hardware only Approach 
This approach makes use of ASICs (Application Specific Integrated Circuits) to implement a 
given cryptography algorithm in hardware. This policy allow controlling precisely the 
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parameters energy, computation capacity and time constraints but it is generally not optimum 
for the flexibility and cost parameters. The FPGA solution allows to reach the flexibility 
demand but to the detriment of cost and sometimes energy. Research in the ASIC or SoC 
approaches is generally focused on the optimization of the basic security functions. In [4] a 
crypto-coprocessor, dedicated to the IPSec applications, is presented which speed up the 
basic security functions (authentication, confidentiality, integrity) with low power 
consumption. However, the countermeasures against security attacks are also explored. In [5] 
a new logic style for secure IC against differential power analysis is presented. 
iii) Hybrid Approach 
This approach is a combination of the two previous approaches. It optimizes the overall 
partitioning of functionality between HW and SW, as well as between the system host 
processor and security processor, to maximize overall processing efficiency while satisfying 
other design constraints. It is the best trade-off between efficiency and flexibility but it 
requires a clear vision of the complete system and a good communication between the 
hardware designers, the software designers and the security experts [6,7]. 
 
Figure 2.2:  Classification of Security processing Architectures 
 
The research on existing solutions is divided into two main topics: optimization of the basic 
security functions and countermeasures against security attacks. Table 2.1 presents the 
functionality comparison for existing solutions between these two topics for the publications 
used as references for this state of art evaluation. Optimization parameters like energy, 
computational time, memory requirement, flexibility, cost, reliability, etc are concerns for 
IoT. The major parameters of concern for resource constraint systems are energy, 
computational time and cost. 
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Table 2.1:  Functionality comparison for existing solutions 
 
Existing solutions[6-12]/ 
Comparison Parameters 
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An FPGA Implementation of 
a Flexible Secure ECC 
Processor   
√ 
 
√ √ 
 
HW-SW Implementation of 
Public-Key Cryptography for 
Wireless Sensor Networks   
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
Implementing Embedded 
Security on Dual-Virtual-CPU 
Systems   
√ √ 
  
√ 
A security approach for off-
chip memory in embedded 
microprocessor systems   
√ 
   
√ 
A compiler-hardware 
approach to software 
protection for embedded 
systems 
 
√ √ 
 
√ 
  
Embedded security: New 
trends in personal recognition 
systems  
√ √ 
   
√ 
A data-driven approach for 
embedded security   
√ 
    
 
All solutions discussed basically focus on to speed up the basic security functions and it does 
not provide solutions against the majority of the security attacks. So, there is a need for an 
embedded security framework and architecture which will move security considerations from 
a function-centric perspective to system architecture (HW-SW) design issue. 
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2.3 Embedded Security Issues in IoT 
 
This section discusses the building blocks for Embedded Security and presents the issues 
and challenges in IoT. 
 
2.3.1 Building Blocks for Embedded Security 
 
Embedded security means building security in from the start i.e. security features built into a 
device. Some of the major building blocks for embedded security for IoT is listed below [13, 
14]:  
1. Cryptographic Algorithms: These are basically the essential building block of a robust 
security solution. Two types of algorithms generally used are symmetric cryptography 
and public key cryptography. The unusual design constraints placed on embedded 
devices require a new lightweight, highly efficient, easy to deploy cryptography 
scheme that provides high levels of security while minimizing memory, execution 
speed requirements, and power requirements. ECC is an essential methodology for 
meeting these requirements of embedded designs and can serve as a good alternative 
for embedded security. 
2. Secure Storage: Cryptographic algorithms require keys as their basis for operation. 
Since the algorithms are published and known to all, including to potential attackers, 
protecting the secrecy of the key is an important issue for security. Secure Storage 
essentially deals with protecting access to keys and other pieces of data. Secure 
storage also needs to be persistent, such that items are not lost during power cycles. 
Examples of persistent storage are on-chip ROM memory, on-chip One-Time-
Programmable (OTP) technology, as well as off-chip flash memory. 
3. Secure Boot: The purpose of secure boot is to bring the system to a known and trusted 
state. The secure boot routine is a ROM-based routine, so that an attacker cannot 
intercept the procedure. Additional features are required in order to provide a 
complete secure boot solution. These include the ability for software update at any 
point in time i.e a software version revocation mechanism for system advancement to 
a new version of the software image with prevention of roll-back to an older version 
is a must. 
4. Secure JTAG: The JTAG interface is a debugging interface for chips. It is used 
primarily during development and manufacturing, but also used to help debug errors 
that are found in the course of the lifetime of the system. The JTAG interface is 
potentially exploitable by attackers, who can try to read internal registers or 
memories.  
5. Secure Execution Environment (SEE): It refers to a processing unit which is capable 
of executing applications in a protected manner. The building blocks of an SEE are :  
a secure processor (either a dedicated processor or one capable of supporting a secure 
mode) which is hardware compartmentalized from the non-secure mode, secure code 
and data memory (most likely dedicated on-chip RAMs) and a secure kernel for 
providing the interface between hardware and software. 
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2.3.2 Issues and challenges 
Making embedded devices secure is not only protecting resources and assets but also 
providing opportunities for new services and new businesses in the optic of IoT. The new 
applications of IoT bring also new security issues: 
 With the advent of IoT, cost of the embedded device will be cheap with higher degree 
of networking. Networking, sharing resources and holding sensitive assets exposes 
these devices to a growing potential risks.  
 Traditional or conventional security solutions that exist are not feasible for majority of 
the devices involved in IoT because of the power, computation speed and memory 
limitations. The common characteristics of embedded devices - mobile and resource 
constrained systems─ enforce researchers to take a new look at current solutions.  
 Application of IoT in areas such as health care, avionics, or car industry where 
humans are involved raises the issue of safety. For example, the violation of integrity 
and availability of an artificial hearth, brake of a car and navigation system of an 
airplane may have disastrous consequences. Attacks are turning from digital-data 
attacks to human attacks. 
 Legal usage of various applications / devices for financial gain will require security 
for revenue protection. 
 There will be many new applications or business models that strongly depend on the 
security requirements. e.g., pay-TV, video on demand or time-limited services. 
 IoT systems are able to track, sense and capture a huge amount of data, such as 
location, status of a user, and personal data. There will be a huge amount of data to 
manage and protect. 
 The secure identification of device is a major concern for a large number of 
applications, considering the software download or digital rights, for example. 
2.4 Enhanced embedded security framework 
 
The basic embedded security framework should consider the following things: 
1. Environment factor: With respect to the environment in which the devices operate 
determine the assumptions, threats, vulnerabilities, attacks, and required policies for 
secure functioning. 
2. Security Objectives: Determine your device's security objectives. Consider the data 
(assets) or operation it will protect and which threats from step 1 require 
countermeasures. 
3. Requirements: Determine your functional security requirements. 
 
The basic idea for framing the security architecture for IoT is to utilize security mechanisms 
and protocols effectively and to start off with a design that takes security into consideration 
from the start of requirements gathering to maintenance as seen in figure 2.3 following the 
software development life cycle. 
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Figure 2.3: Embedded security design steps 
 
For building the embedded security Framework for IoT, we also need to look at all of the 
tradeoffs between performance, cost, and security. Unfortunately, these three concepts are 
almost always directly at odds with one another. More performance means the cost goes up, 
lowering the cost means lowering security and performance, and implementing higher 
security means performance will decrease. Hardware software based security architecture for 
IoT is proposed which should be the best trade off for cost/efficiency or security/performance 
as shown in figure 2.4. 
 
Figure 2.4: Hardware Software Security implementation performances 
 
Figure 2.5 illustrates the proposed embedded security framework and architecture for IoT. 
The architecture can be divided into hardware and software level with lightweight 
standardized protocols supporting at the physical and MAC layer. The level of security within 
the device will vary depending on the nature of the protected content and kind of application. 
The architecture should provide physical protection to secret keys by keeping the components 
like secure ROM, which is handling the secret keys, inside the secure SoC. The Secure Boot 
loader should ensure that the device boots up with the genuine OS or firmware with right 
process privileges. Secure ROM, secure runtime execution environment, secure memory 
management unit are the prime focus for inbuilt security. Also rich operating system with 
necessary security functionality, secure kernel interface and compatible standardized security 
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protocols for IoT system will contribute towards the secure security architecture and 
framework for IoT. Thus the secure architecture is based on three main components i.e. 
secure software management, secure hardware blocks and secure communications inside the 
processor. If any one of these is missing device security cannot be achieved. 
 
Figure 2.5: Embedded security framework and architecture 
 
A cost effective designs use a mixture of hardware and software to accomplish overall 
security goals. This provides sufficient motivation for attempting a synthesis-oriented 
approach to achieve security system implementations having both hardware and software 
components. Such an approach would benefit from a systematic analysis of design trade-offs 
that is common in synthesis while also creating cost effective systems. 
Following are the key features of the security framework : 
1. Lightweight cryptography:  Optimized Cryptographic algorithms and hardware 
architecture for extreme low power, memory and processing requirements. 
2. Physical Security: Trusted Platform module which will take into account the 
vulnerabilities of the hardware device at physical level. 
3. Standardized security Protocols: Development of standardized protocols which are 
both lightweight with respect to communication and cryptographic computations.  
4. Secure operating systems: Rich operating systems with a secure kernel which will 
ensure a secure communication inside the processor by providing secure runtime 
execution environment, secure booting, secure content, etc. 
5. Future application Areas: Understanding the technical, economic, social context of a 
given application area, in order to develop security solutions which are appropriate 
and acceptable. 
6. Secure Storage: Protect the sensitive information stored in RAM / ROM and 
secondary storage and efficient key management. 
7. Protection against different attacks. 
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2.5 Authentication Schemes for IoT 
 
Devices like RFID or sensor node themselves have no access control function, so they can 
freely obtain information from each other. As a result, an authentication as well as 
authorization scheme must be established between devices so as to achieve the security goals 
for IoT. In RFID, tag security issue related to the scenario, like the communication between a 
tag and a reader which is by radio, anyone can access the tag and obtains its output, i.e. 
attackers can eavesdrop on the communication channel between tags and readers, which is a 
cause of consumer’s apprehension. So the authentication scheme employed in RFID must be 
able to protect the data passing between the tag and the reader, i.e. the security solution itself 
should have some kind of encryption capability.  
 
Figure 2.6:  Authentication Scheme 
 
Authentication is related to secure identification of devices in which there is need for 
verification of identity possession. Every act of an access control will enable authentication 
process. So, secure identity establishment is promising in nomadic IoT which is prone to 
many threats [15, 16]. Authentication with encryption can solve all of the former mentioned 
security threats in IoT scenario like RFID and sensor Networks applications. 
Broadly there are three authentication schemes: password systems (weak authentication), 
challenge-response authentication (strong authentication), and customized and zero-
knowledge authentication [17]. Password systems oﬀers a weak level of security and zero-
knowledge techniques are often related to “strong” mathematical problems which are very 
costly in calculation and implementation. So we aim for the second type, the challenge-
response techniques, which are broadly used. There are asymmetric and symmetric 
challenge-response techniques. The disadvantage of asymmetric authentication methods is 
that they are very time consuming and costly to implement in hardware. So, they are not the 
first choice for resource constraints devices. This classification is shown in figure 2.6. 
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2.6 AES-GCM based embedded security protocol  
 
This section presents an Authenticated encryption scheme that will best suited for IoT and 
also proposes on device capability based authentication and access control protocol for IoT. 
Further it also evaluates the proposed protocol in terms of its mutual authentication process, 
resistance to attack and efficiency. 
 
2.6.1 Authentication and Encryption using AES-GCM   
 
Authenticated encryption is evolving as a relatively new concept that will provide both 
message encryption and authentication which can be adapted for embedding security in 
device. AES-GCM is one of the latest authenticated encryption algorithms providing both 
confidentiality and authenticity suitable for hardware implementation. AES-GCM accepts 
four inputs namely symmetric key, Initialization vector (IV), Plaintext and an optional field 
for authenticating data. The output of AES-GSM is the cipher text and the message. The 
Initialization Vector (IV) is generated by the device performing the authenticated encryption 
operation. It can also be a nonce within the scope of any authenticated encryption key with 
uniqueness. Repeating nonce for two different messages encrypted with the same key 
destroys the security properties. The optional additional authenticated data can be used to 
authenticate    plaintext packet headers. AES-GCM makes use of the AES block cipher in 
counter mode to provide encryption. When used properly, counter mode provides   strong 
confidentiality [18]. GCM uses universal hashing in the ﬁnite ﬁeld GF(2w ) for generating a 
message authentication code (MAC). The additional merit of using GF(2
w
 ) is that the 
computation cost of multiplication under GF(2
w
 ) is less than integer multiplication. AES-
GCM provides high security suitable for hardware implementation. Therefore, the use of 
AES-GCM is the best solution for resource constrained device to meet the security needs of 
IoT devices [19, 20]. Implementing AES-GCM on resource constrained devices with 
hardware software co-design approach will surely match the Security requirements for IoT 
enhancing the speed and storage area parameters. For prevention against replay attacks, use 
of different session key for encryption of plaintexts will help to guarantee confidentiality 
which can be done through GCM. Proposed protocol is using capability based addressing [21, 
22] along with AES-GCM for access control of devices. Capability corresponds to row view 
of access control matrix [23]. 
2.6.2 Proposed Protocol  
 
In this work, we propose on device capability based authentication and access control 
protocol. Novelty of this protocol is in its cryptographic capability which acts as a ticket to 
access other device. This capability is then encrypted using AES–GCM which strongly 
provides both encryption and authentication for resource constrained devices. This protocol is 
mutual authentication protocol and it also addresses capability based access control. 
Conceptually, a capability is a token, ticket, or key that gives permission to access an device. 
A capability is implemented as a data structure that contains items like a unique device 
identifier, access rights and a random number, as shown in figure 2.7. The identifier 
addresses or names are single to device in IoT. Any device, in this context, can be equipped 
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with RFID tags or sensor nodes.  The access rights define the operations that can be 
performed on that device.  
 
 
Figure 2.7:  Capability structure 
For simplicity, it is sufficient to examine the case where a capability describes a set of access 
rights for the device. Device may also contain security attributes such as access rights or 
other access control information. A classic capability is represented as a ticket as: (Device, 
Rights, Random) in which the first item is the name / id of the device, second is the set of 
access rights and the third is a random number to prevent forgery. Algorithm for one way 
hash function can be made publicly available. It should be secret keys independent because 
key distribution introduces other difficulties. Benefits of using one way hash function are that 
it is computationally infeasible to inverse hash function and, given a pair of input and 
matching output it is infeasible to find a second input which gets the same output. When an 
access request arrives together with a capability consisting of object id, the one-way function 
is run to check the result against the random number to detect tampering. If the capability is 
valid, the access is granted [23]. 
 
Table 2.2 refers to the notations used in the proposed protocol. Working of this protocol is 
shown in figure 2.8.  
Table 2.2:  Notation used  
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There are two components of this protocol: first is the creation of capability and second 
component is an application of AES – GCM. Device 1 creates its capability which is a 
function of device id and access rights which is then encrypted and hashed along with a 
random number to prevent forgery. Underlying algorithm for encryption is AES-GCM. 
Cipher text which is created is sent to device 2.  Device 2 receives the capability of device 1 
in encrypted form which is decrypted using symmetric key. Tampering of received cipher 
text is verified using one way hash function. If the generated hash value and the received 
hash value do not match then it is evident that the communication has been tampered and 
some other device is trying to impersonate and the authentication is violated. If there is a 
match in generated hash value and received hash value after decryption, then device 1 is 
authenticated to device 2. Encryption and its hardware implementations are efficient in 
resource constrained devices due to features of AES-GCM. The computations overhead on 
device are less optimizing energy. 
As it is a mutual authentication protocol, device 2 have to authenticate itself to device 1. For 
this, device 2 creates its capability by same method as explained above and uses the same 
random number sent by device 1 to prevent from replay attacks. After receiving this response 
at device1, it decrypts this cipher text and checks the integrity and compares the random 
number to ensure that this message is coming from the same device which is authenticated by 
device 1. After successful decryption and comparison, device 2 is authenticated to device 1 
and they are free to communicate with each other over secure channel. It is very important to 
note that, access right has been communicated to each other securely to achieve secure access 
control. This protocol is challenge response type of protocol which alleviates the overhead on 
both the devices.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.8 Proposed protocol 
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2.6.3 Evaluation of Proposed Protocol 
 
The proposed protocol is evaluated in terms of its mutual authentication process, resistance to 
attack and efficiency. 
 Mutual authentication: Only legitimate devices can generate and verify capabilities 
as it is based on secret key, one way hash function. As device identifiers and secret 
key are private and are being sent in encrypted form over communication channel, it 
is being prevented from forgery. AES-GCM provides encryption and authentication to 
capabilities and hence mutual authentication is successfully validated. 
 Replay attack resistance: This resist-attack model is secure for replay attacks, as 
every challenge and response is encrypted with the random number.  
 Computational, traffic and storage cost: The proposed protocol keeps 
computational costs low by requiring only four hashes to validate tampering. To 
guarantee that the device is legitimate, challenge and response protocol proposed here 
sends only three parameters. Thus the traffic cost between two devices is low. Device 
needs storage cost only for storing device identifier and secret key. We assume here 
that appropriate key management is being used. 
 
2.7 Conclusions 
 
Embedded security for IoT will be crucial and important with strong security mechanisms 
which will prevent damages and economical losses offering new business opportunities. 
However, sound security solutions are not attained easily. There are many challenges that 
should be defied. A sound solution considers the security from the beginning i.e. from design 
to implementation, to detect the vulnerabilities from the birth to the death of system. After 
discovering the sources and the reasons of vulnerabilities, safeguards should be embedded in 
the design methodology. A embedded security framework and architecture is dependent on 
precise definitions of parameters like resource constraints, the network specification 
(protocols, throughput, topology, services, etc...) and the system specification (protocols, 
device size, service which are managed, multi-rate specification, etc.). This will provide the 
necessary information to define the boundaries between the secure and insecure part of the 
system (data and hardware levels). Proper system-level study will enable the selection of the 
candidate solutions for the hardware and software parts. These candidates will be used, 
together with the specifications, as inputs for the hardware/software co-design methodology 
which will lead to a security framework and architecture for IoT system. 
The AES-GCM protocol ensures authentication and access control by adding the capabilities 
as a second line of defense. It uses a secret value S, random number r, and hash function h() 
as both static and dynamic security guards. Only authenticated devices can recognize the 
right values of these numbers and access control is achieved correctly. Novelty of this 
protocol is in use of AES –GCM to provide both authentication and encryption with efficient 
low cost implementation in resource constrained devices 
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3 
Jamming Attack: 
Modelling and 
Evaluation 
 
This chapter introduces the jamming attack that take place at 
physical layer and its classification in detail. It also provides 
modelling of jamming attack using activity- and sequential- modelling 
approach and evaluates the different jamming attack in variety of 
network situations. The chapter proposes new possibility of the 
jamming attack i.e. intelligent cluster-based jamming attack and 
evaluates the performance impact of cluster-based jamming attack. 
Lastly, the chapter discusses the requirements to design efficient 
defense mechanism against jamming attack. 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
The research in WSN is growing in large perspective to offer the wide variety of application 
domains. The WSN consist of the large number of nodes, which sends the sensed information 
to the central base station (BS) [1]. The WSN node suffers from large energy constraint 
because of its limited battery power. The major requirement to achieve quality of service 
(QoS) in WSN is to reduce energy consumption with minimum delay and maximum 
throughput. These performance requirements are largely affected by security attacks, which 
happen at various layers of WSN. 
The main objective of this chapter is to model the jamming attack [2, 3], which is one of the 
denials of service attack [4] which blocks the channel by introducing malicious traffic. WSN 
is vastly invaded by the different kinds of jamming attacks at each layer. The chapter mainly 
concentrates on jamming attacks, which occur at physical and medium access control (MAC) 
layer. Here, it is more effective and destructive because these layers are mainly responsible 
for allocating the resources. The different kind of active and reactive jamming attack effects 
on WSN constraints based behaviour, by increasing the energy consumption with increased 
delay and decreased throughput. These are very important performance parameter for 
deciding QoS of WSN. The different kinds of jamming attacks are constant jamming, 
deceptive jamming, random jamming, and reactive jamming. All these jamming attacks are 
modelled to understand the basic sequence of activities during their occurrences in the 
network. The author uses unified modelling language (UML) [5] based activity and 
sequential modelling approaches for modelling the behaviour of various jamming attacks. 
Activity modelling models the behaviour by considering different states and shows the 
various conditions, message transmission between the states. It is one of the useful ways to 
understand the intelligent behaviour of jamming attack. The activity modelling also gives the 
understanding of required security solution for reducing the effect of attack on WSN 
performance. Sequential modelling is one of the widely used ways to model the system using 
UML. It is used to illustrate the interactions between different entities of system. 
The next objective of chapter is to evaluate the jamming attack and to understand the level 
of performance degradation due to different kind of jamming attacks. The evaluation is 
performed using varying time interval and number of malicious nodes in the network. The 
evaluation show that the reactive jamming attack is one of the unpredictable and disastrous 
jamming attacks as compared to other jamming attacks. The chapter also provides insight on 
new kind of jamming attack i.e. intelligent cluster head (CH) jamming attack. This attack 
initiates the attack on CH and penetrates it in the whole network. The performance evaluation 
of intelligent CH jamming attack shows that, the attack is more destructive than normal 
reactive jamming attack. 
3.2 Jamming Attack classification 
 
The jamming attack is classified as, 
 Constant Jamming 
 Deceptive Jamming 
 Random Jamming 
 Reactive Jamming 
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Constant jamming: The constant jamming attack jammer continually emits a radio signal, 
and can be implemented using either a waveform generator that continuously sends a radio 
signal or a normal wireless device that continuously sends out random bits to the channel 
without following any MAC-layer etiquette [8]. Normally, the underlying MAC protocol 
allows legitimate nodes to send out packets only if the channel is idle. Thus, a constant 
jammer can effectively prevent legitimate traffic sources from getting hold of a channel and 
sending packets. 
Deceptive jamming: Instead of sending out random bits, in the deceptive jamming the 
jammer constantly injects regular packets to the channel without any gap between subsequent 
packet transmissions. As a result, a normal communicator will be deceived into believing 
there is a legitimate packet and be duped to remain in the receive state. Even if a node has 
packets to send, it cannot switch to the send state because a constant stream of incoming 
packets will be detected. 
Random jamming: Instead of continuously sending out a radio signal, a random jammer 
alternates between sleeping and jamming. Specifically, after jamming for a while, it turns off 
its radio and enters a “sleeping” mode. It will resume jamming after sleeping for some time. 
During its jamming phase, it can behave like either a constant jammer or a deceptive jammer. 
This jammer model tries to take energy conservation into consideration, which is especially 
important for those jammers that do not have unlimited power supply. 
Reactive jamming: The three models discussed above are active jammers in the sense that 
they try to block the channel irrespective of the traffic pattern on the channel. Active jammers 
are usually effective because they keep the channel busy all the time.  Active methods are 
relatively easy to detect. An alternative approach to jamming wireless communication is to 
employ a reactive strategy. The reactive jammer stays quiet when the channel is idle, but 
starts transmitting a radio signal as soon as it senses activity on the channel. One advantage 
of reactive jammer is that it is harder to detect. 
3.3 Modelling and Evaluation of Jamming Attack  
 
This section models the behavior of different types of jamming attack using sequential and 
activity modelling approaches under unified modelling language (UML). The differences 
between activity modelling and sequential modelling are, (i) activity modelling gives high-
level understandings of the system functionalities while sequential modelling gives low-level 
dynamic interaction between the objects, (ii) activity modelling describes the data flow 
between users and system while sequential modelling illustrates the objects involved and 
messages exchanged during the data transfer. Here, the modelling of jamming attack using 
activity- and sequential- modelling gives the complete understanding of attack behaviour 
with its high level data flows, objects involved, and messages exchanged during the 
interaction of different objects.  
3.3.1 Activity Modelling of Jamming Attacks  
The activity modelling explains the functional view of a system by describing or representing 
logical processes, or functions. Here, each logical process is represented as a sequence of 
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tasks and the decisions that govern when and how they are performed. Activity modelling is 
one of the UML representations for giving functional view of any processes or tasks [5, 8]. 
UML is designed to support the description of behaviours that depends upon the results of 
internal processes. The flow in an activity diagram is driven by the completion of an action. 
The activity diagram is useful tool to understand the basic flow of security attacks. 
3.3.1.1 Constant Jamming 
 
Figure 3.1: Activity modelling of constant jamming attack 
Figure 3.1 shows the activity modelling of constant jamming attack. It gives insight of 
different activities that takes place during the execution of attack on a network. The 
sequences of activities are as follows, 
 The attacker initiates the constant jamming attack. If attack is successful then node in 
a network will behave like a constant jammer and start to jam the network, otherwise 
node will do a regular activity. 
Chapter 3 Jamming Attack: Modelling and Evaluation 
 
50 
 
 The normal node detects some event and tries to send the data to another node or 
destination. It checks for availability of channel, if channel is available then it will 
send data on the channel and send it towards the destination. If channel is not 
available then it will check for channel repeatedly after some particular interval. 
 The jammer node generates the random data after some particular time interval and it 
will try to send the random data without following MAC rules i.e. without checking 
for channel. 
 The random data generated from the jammer node may collide with data coming 
from normal node and it jams the whole traffic in the network by increasing the 
collision in network. The severity of constant jamming will be more if the interval 
between the random generations of data is too small.  
3.3.1.2 Deceptive Jamming 
 
Figure 3.2: Activity modelling of deceptive jamming attack 
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Figure 3.2 shows the flow of activities in case of deceptive jamming attack. In case of 
deceptive jamming, attacker will take whole charge of channel by making the channel busy. 
The different activities that happen during accomplishment of attack are as follows, 
 The external attacker initiates the deceptive jamming attack on node in a network. If 
attack is successful the normal node will act like a deceptive jammer otherwise it will 
behave like a normal node.  
 The normal node generates the data and tries to send the data towards the destination 
by checking the availability of channel.  
 The jammer node generates the data packets continuously without keeping any time 
gap between the two packets. This continuous generation of packets put the channel in 
busy state for long time. 
 The busy state of channel because of deceptive jamming keeps other normal node to 
be in receiving state. This behavior of deceptive jamming increases the energy 
consumption, delay and decreases the total throughput of the network. 
 
3.3.1.3 Random Jamming 
 
Figure 3.3: Activity modelling of random jamming attack 
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Figure 3.3 shows the different activities that takes place during the execution of random 
jamming attack. The random jamming attack is kind of intelligent attack where the jamming 
node thinks for saving of its own energy. Therefore, it works in two modes, jamming mode, 
and sleep mode. The details of execution of attack are as follows, 
 If attack is successful, then the external attacker will initiate the attack by converting 
the normal node into jamming node. 
 If channel is available, the normal node detects some event and tries to send the data 
packet towards another node or destination. The sender node checks for channel 
availability every time whenever it has data to send.  
 The jammer node here works in two modes to save its energy and to last its effect for 
long time. In jamming mode it make channel busy either by continuously generating 
packet like deceptive jamming or generate random data after some specified interval 
without following MAC rules like constant jamming. 
 The continuous block of channel by jammer node place the normal node in receive 
state for long time. 
 The normal node changes its receiving state or can get the availability for some time 
whenever jammer node goes to sleep state. This behavior of attack introduces the 
longer amount of delay in the transmission of data from the node. 
 
3.3.1.4 Reactive Jamming 
Figure 3.4 shows the activity modelling of reactive jamming. It shows the execution steps of 
nodes in a network in case of reactive jamming. The steps are as follows, 
 The reactive jamming attack is initiated by attacking on normal node, if it is 
successful then node will act like a reactive jammer, otherwise the normal node does 
its designated operations.   
 The main feature of the attack is that it gets activated when other nodes in the network 
are busy to send data or if the channel is busy. 
 Here, the normal node tries to send data towards the concern destination by checking 
the availability of channel and send the data on channel. 
 The jammer node checks the status of channel. If channel is ideal it will go to quiet 
state where it will do nothing, else if channel is busy the jammer will activate and 
generate the noise packet continuously which results in collision in the network. 
 The reactive jammer gets activated when the channel is busy. Therefore, it is very 
difficult to detect and reduce the effect of channel on performance of network. 
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Figure 3.4: Activity modelling of reactive jamming attack 
 
3.3.2 Sequential Modelling of Jamming Attack  
 
The sequence diagram is used primarily to show the interactions between objects in the 
sequential order in which those interactions occur. The sequence diagram is also called as 
message sequence charts. A sequence diagram shows, as parallel vertical lines, the different 
processes or objects that live simultaneously, and, as horizontal arrows, the messages 
exchanged between them, in the order in which they occur.  
It considers jamming attacker and different nodes in network as entities and interaction 
between them as the processes. It also considers normal behaviour of each node as, node 
transmit data after successful exchange of RTS and CTS. In each attack situation, external 
attacker initiates the attack on any of the node in the network and converts those nodes into 
malicious nodes, who are acting as a malicious node or jammer. 
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A. Constant Jamming Attack 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Sequential modelling of constant jamming attack 
Figure 3.5 show the sequential modelling of constant jamming attack. It shows sequence of 
interaction between normal nodes, malicious nodes, and attacker. The sequence of activities 
is as follows, 
 Nodes 0 have data to send, it checks the channel by transmitting request to send 
(RTS) packet and gets the reply as clear to send (CTS), if channel is available then it 
send the data towards consigned destination. 
 The external attacker initiates the constant jamming attack on any of the node in 
network and converts that node as malicious nodes, who now act as constant jammer.  
 The normal node 0 have data to send, it transmit RTS packet towards node n for 
checking the channel in between them. The RTS found channel idle so destination 
node n start to send the CTS packets towards node 0. Here, at same time if constant 
jammer node, node 1 generates random data, it will collide with CTS coming from 
node n. 
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 Here, constant jamming node, node 1 generated random data after some particular 
interval. 
 The constant jammer is activated again after some interval and generates random data 
and transmits it in the network. During that time another node 2 send RTS, receive 
CTS and starts to send data but data from node 1 will collide with random data 
generated from constant jammer node 1. 
B.  Deceptive Jamming Attack 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Sequential modelling of deceptive jamming attack 
Figure 3.6 show the modelling of deceptive jamming attack using sequential modelling 
approach. Sequential modelling of deceptive jamming shows the different actions that take 
place on different objects (attacker and normal nodes) during execution of attack. The actions 
are as follows, 
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 Nodes 0 have data to send, it checks the channel by transmitting request to send 
(RTS) packet and gets the reply as clear to send (CTS), if channel is available then it 
send the data towards consigned destination. 
 The attacker initiates the deceptive jamming attack on node 1 and converts it as 
deceptive jammer. The deceptive jammer generates the malicious data continuously 
without any difference between the two malicious data. 
 Here, node 0 sends the RTS packet, receive CTS and try to send data packets towards 
the destination. The data packets may collide with malicious data and generates 
collision on channel. 
 The deceptive jammer generates malicious data continuously which increase the 
collision in the network and may place large number of nodes in the network in 
receive state. 
C.  Random Jamming Attack 
 
Figure 3.7 show the sequence of activities in case of random jamming attack. The different 
events and message passed in network are as follows, 
 Nodes 0 have data to send, it checks the channel by transmitting request to send 
(RTS) packet and gets the reply as clear to send (CTS), if channel is available then it 
send the data towards consigned destination. 
 The attacker initiates the random jamming attack on any node in the network. Here, it 
initiated the attack on node 1 and converts it as random jammer which act randomly 
as constant jammer or deceptive jammer. 
 Figure shows that the node generates the random data after some interval and leads to 
collision after regular interval like a constant jammer. 
 Here, the random jammer acts intelligently and tries to save its energy by going to 
sleep state. The jammer node goes to sleep node after jamming the network for some 
amount of time for saving its energy and to last the effect of attack for large time in 
network. 
 After waking up from sleep mode it may act like a constant jammer or deceptive 
jammer. Here, it acts like a deceptive jammer which jams the network by increasing 
the collision and placing the nodes in receive state. 
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Figure 3.7:  Sequential modelling of random jamming attack 
D.  Reactive Jamming Attack 
Figure 3.8 show the sequential modelling of reactive jamming attack. The reactive jamming 
attack is the most intelligent jamming attack which reacts in the network by observing the 
events in the network. The sequences of action in the network are, 
 Nodes 0 have data to send, it checks the channel by transmitting request to send 
(RTS) packet and gets the reply as clear to send (CTS), if channel is available then it 
send the data towards consigned destination. 
 The attacker initiates the reactive jamming attack on node 1 and converts the normal 
node as reactive jammer which acts by analysing the state of the network. 
 The reactive jammer goes to quiet state if there is no any event in the network. 
 The normal node 0 sends RTS to node n, the reactive jammer node sense this activity 
on channel and sends the noise packets in the network. These noise packets may 
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collide with CTS packet and generate the collision in the network. The attacker gets 
activated here every time whenever jammer senses the activity on channel.   
 
Figure 3.8: Sequential modelling of reactive jamming attack 
 
3.3.3 Evaluation of Jamming Attacks 
This section describes the evaluation of jamming attack under different network conditions. It 
is necessary to understand the actual working behaviour of jamming, which will be useful to 
develop good countermeasure on jamming. The implementation of jamming attack for 
evaluation is based on modelling described in the previous section. The modelling in previous 
section had given clear understanding of the objects involved during jamming and the 
interaction between them. The evaluation of jamming is performed to check the effect of 
jamming attack, under different traffic conditions and varying number of malicious nodes in 
the network. The evaluation of jamming in different traffic conditions is necessary to 
understand the jamming effect in varying traffic conditions. The evaluation by varying 
number of malicious nodes is good tool to understand the level of jamming.  
3.3.3.1 Simulation Details 
The implementation of all attack is performed by using discrete event simulator NS-2 
(Network Simulator-2). The parameters set during simulations are shown in Table 3.1. The 
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idle power, receiving power, transmission power, and sleep power are considered according 
to IEEE 802.15.4 radio model [9].  
The simulations are performed in five different conditions. The different conditions are, 
 WSN without any security attack 
 WSN with constant jamming attack 
 WSN with deceptive jamming attack 
 WSN with random jamming attack 
 WSN with reactive jamming attack 
The simulation of jamming attacks is done under following consideration, 
 The simulation is performed by varying traffic interval, which is useful to measure the 
performance of attack under various traffic conditions. The traffic interval is varied 
from 1s to 10s. The 1s traffic interval is consider as fast traffic and 10s traffic interval 
is consider as slow traffic. These simulations consider number of malicious nodes in 
network or nodes under attack is one. 
 The second set of simulation is performed by varying number of malicious nodes in 
the network. The number of malicious nodes in network considered is 1,2,4,8 and 16. 
The traffic interval considers under this simulation is 1s which is consider to be the 
fast traffic in network. These set of simulations will be useful to analyze the effect of 
attack by increasing the destructive entities in network. 
Table 3.1 Simulation and node parameters 
Parameter Name Setting Used 
Network Interface type Wireless Physical:802.15.4 
Radio Propagation Model Two-Ray Ground 
Antenna Omni-directional antenna 
Channel Type Wireless Channel 
Link Layer Link Layer (LL) 
Interface Queue Priority Queue 
Buffer size of IFq 50 
MAC 802.15.4 
Routing Protocol Ad-hoc routing 
Energy Model EnergyModel 
Initial Energy (initialEnergy_) 100J 
Idle Power (idlePower_) 31mW 
Receiving Power (rxPower_) 35mW 
Transmission Power (txPower_) 31mW 
Sleep Power (sleepPower_) 15μW 
Number of nodes 100 
Node Placement Random 
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3.3.3.2 Results and Discussions 
A. Performance by varying interval 
 
Figure 3.9: Comparative Energy Consumption Analysis of jamming attacks under varying 
traffic interval 
 
Figure 3.10: Comparative Delay Analysis of jamming attacks under varying traffic interval 
Figure 3.9, 3.10, and 3.11 shows the comparative analysis of reactive jamming, random 
jamming, deceptive jamming, and constant jamming with no-attack condition by varying the 
interval in the network. The analysis is done by measuring three parameters of sensor 
network: energy consumption, delay, and throughput respectively as shown in figure 3.9, 
3.10, and 3.11. The jamming attack reduces the performance of the WSN in larger manner. 
The reason of performance degradation under different types of jamming attack is as follows, 
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 Constant Jamming: The constant jamming attacks are initiated in the network by 
generating the noise packet which will be sent without following any MAC rules of 
the network. The figure shows that performance degradation by constant jamming 
attack is less than other kind of jamming attack because it jams the network after 
regular interval i.e. it generates the noise packets after some regular interval. 
 Deceptive Jamming: The deceptive jamming jams the network by producing the noise 
packets continuously in the network without any time interval between the two noise 
packets. The main reason for showing more performance degradation than constant 
jamming is continuous generation of noise packets which increase the energy 
consumption, delay and decrease the throughput of network by producing large 
amount of collision in the network which jams the channel. 
 Random Jamming: The random jamming randomly jams either by using constant 
jamming or deceptive jamming. Here, jammer node also thinks for its own energy by 
going to sleep for some amount of time. The performance curve of random jamming 
shows that its performance is varying in very random manner, sometimes it is more 
than deceptive jamming sometime it is less than deceptive jamming. The major reason 
for its random behavior is use of both kind of jamming according to situation. It is 
difficult to detect random attack because of its random behavior.  
 Reactive Jamming: The performance graphs shows that the reactive jamming is most 
disastrous kind of jamming attack. Here, its performance is degrading with increase in 
interval. It produces the noise packets in network immediately after detecting any 
event on the channel. This behavior of it, corrupt or lose large number of packets in 
the network by introducing vast amount of collision in the network. 
 
Figure 3.11: Comparative Throughput Analysis of jamming attacks under varying traffic 
interval 
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B. Performance by varying number of malicious nodes 
 
Figure 3.12: Energy consumption analysis of different jamming attacks with varying number 
of malicious nodes 
 
Figure 3.13: Delay analysis of different jamming attacks with varying number of malicious 
nodes 
Figure 3.12, 3.13, and 3.14 describes the performance degradation of constant-, deceptive-, 
random- and reactive- jamming in terms of energy consumption, delay, and throughput by 
varying number of malicious nodes in the network. The graph shows that the performance 
degradation in network is increasing with number of malicious nodes in the network because 
more malicious nodes in the network generate more malicious traffic which helps in reducing 
the total performance of network. Figure 3.12 shows the energy consumption under different 
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jamming attack. Here, all attack performance reduction is increasing than one on another; 
only random jamming energy consumption is less than deceptive jamming under less number 
of nodes but it also more than deceptive- and constant- jamming with more number of nodes. 
The random jamming shows less energy consumption than deceptive jamming and more 
delay than it because it allows malicious nodes to go to sleep mode after some regular 
interval which helps to save energy but increase delay which is also not advantageous if 
number of nodes in network are more. 
 
Figure 3.14: Throughput analysis of different jamming attacks with varying number of 
malicious nodes 
3.4 Proposal of Cluster Based Jamming Attack  
 
The previous sections of chapter describe the jamming attack, its modelling and evaluation 
under network situations. The jamming considered in the previous sections and in literature is 
mainly for flat network, where the network is not divided into the parts. This kind of network 
is more prone to jamming as attack penetrates in faster way and destruct the network. The 
other kind of network is cluster-based network, where network is divided into small parts, 
called as clusters. Each cluster consists of CH, other nodes in cluster communicate with CH, 
and CH transmits the information to BS on behalf of other nodes. Cluster-based networks are 
scalable, having good energy efficiency and less prone to attack, as attack penetration limits 
to cluster. Therefore, more IoT applications preferred to use cluster-based network [7, 10]. 
These growing demands of cluster-based network lead to security loopholes in the system. 
Here, the section gives the details of possible reactive jamming attack named “Intelligent 
Cluster Head Attack” in cluster-based network and its evaluation to show how it is more 
destructive than other kind of jamming attacks. 
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3.4.1 Intelligent Cluster Head Jamming Attack 
The attacker consider in this attack is intelligent attacker who can differentiate between the 
cluster head (CH) [11] and normal node in the network and continuously taking track of 
cluster head traffic. The main task of CH is to aggregate the information from normal nodes 
in the network and send it to the base station or other in between CH. Here, intelligent 
jammer initiates the attack whenever it detects some event on CH i.e. whenever CH is ready 
to transmit some aggregated data or receive some data from normal node. Once the jammer 
detects the event on CH it initiates the attack on CH and makes the CH as malicious CH. The 
all links in the network are considered to be bidirectional. The malicious CH can generate 
noise packets towards the BS or other CH and also towards the normal node in that cluster. 
The noise packets transmitted inside the cluster jam the traffic inside the cluster i.e. it jams 
the intra-cluster traffic and noise packets transmitted in between the CH jams the inter-cluster 
traffic. This way it creates the black hole in network which starts to eat whole network by 
producing malicious data. 
3.4.2 Sequential modelling of Intelligent Cluster-Head Jamming Attack 
 
Figure 3.15:  Sequential modelling of intelligent CH jamming attack 
Figure 3.15 show the sequence of activities that happens during the deployment of intelligent 
CH jamming attack. The different activities are as follows, 
 The attacker is continuously monitoring the traffic from the CH. 
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 Node 0, 1 and 2 have data to send and they will send it towards the CH, CH will 
aggregate the information and will try to send the data towards another CHs or BS. 
 Whenever attacker senses the traffic on the CH it initiates the attack on CH1 and 
makes it malicious CH.  
 Malicious CH1 send malicious aggregated data to other CHs and will try to make 
them malicious. This way it will make other CHs malicious by sending malicious data 
towards them. Therefore, whatever data will reach to the BS will be the malicious and 
leads to wrong decision at BS. 
 The malicious CHs can also send noise packet inside and outside the cluster. The 
aggregated data send outside the cluster and noise packet from malicious CH may 
collide, that leads to inter-cluster collision. The noise packet coming inside the cluster 
collides with normal data send by normal node and leads to intra-cluster collision.  
3.4.3 Performance Impact of Intelligent CH Jamming Attack 
The simulation uses same simulation parameters as shown in Table 3.2 which was used in 
previous set of simulation of jamming attacks. The clustering algorithm used for formation of 
cluster is LEACH [12]. 
Table 3.2: Simulation Parameters 
Parameter Name Setting Used 
Network Interface type Wireless Physical:802.15.4 
Radio Propagation Model Two-Ray Ground 
Antenna Omni-directional antenna 
Channel Type Wireless Channel 
Link Layer Link Layer (LL) 
Interface Queue Priority Queue 
Buffer size of IFq 50 
MAC 802.15.4 
Routing Protocol Ad-hoc routing 
Energy Model EnergyModel 
Initial Energy (initialEnergy_) 100J 
Idle Power (idlePower_) 31mW 
Receiving Power (rxPower_) 35mW 
Transmission Power (txPower_) 31mW 
Sleep Power (sleepPower_) 15μW 
Number of nodes 100 
Node Placement Random 
Figure 3.16, 3.17, and 3.18 shows the energy consumption, delay, and throughput 
respectively due to reactive jamming attack in cluster based network and intelligent CH 
jamming attack. The result of simulation shows that the energy consumption, delay, and 
reduction in throughput due to the intelligent CH jamming attack are more than reactive 
jamming attack. The main reason of reduction in performance in intelligent CH jamming 
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attack is its intelligent behavior. It can make the differentiation of CH and normal node, and 
initiate its attack on CHs which jam the inter- and intra- cluster traffic and increase the total 
energy consumption, delay and reduce the throughput of the network. 
 
Figure 3.16: Comparative Energy consumption evaluation of reactive jamming attack with 
the proposed Intelligent CH jamming attack by varying the traffic interval 
 
Figure 3.17: Comparative Delay evaluation of reactive jamming attack with the proposed 
Intelligent CH jamming attack by varying the traffic interval 
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Figure 3.18: Comparative Throughput evaluation of reactive jamming attack with the 
proposed Intelligent CH jamming attack by varying the traffic interval 
 
3.5 Requirements to Design Efficient Defense Mechanism against Jamming 
Jamming attack can be deployed in system in many different ways and they are increasing as 
the WSN is getting more advanced. Therefore, to save the WSN from jamming, the defence 
mechanism should be developed by considering following requirements,  
 Cross layer features like retransmitted RTS or DATA, failure of carrier sense, 
network allocator vector (NAV), etc. should be considered for detecting the attack 
efficiently because whenever jamming is deployed it changes the values of physical 
and MAC layer features.  
 Nowadays most of the WSN deployments are made using cluster-based networks for 
improving energy efficiency and scalability. Therefore, it is necessary to develop 
defense mechanism by considering cluster-based networks.  
 Use of threshold-based and game theoretic approach for developing efficient defense 
mechanism instead of traditional proactive and reactive development strategies. 
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3.6 Conclusions  
The modelling of different jamming attack on WSN provides the functional view of 
sequence of activities executed during accomplishment of the jamming attack. The 
understanding of the activities will be useful tool to design efficient countermeasures for 
jamming attack. The experimental analysis of jamming attacks shows that reactive jamming 
is more difficult to detect than other attack because of its intelligent behavior. The behavioral 
modelling and analysis of jamming attack is the useful tool to understand the behavior of 
jamming attack and to develop the efficient defense strategy for WSN. The chapter gives the 
new possibility of attack in cluster-based WSN i.e. intelligent CH jamming attack and shows 
that this attack jam the inter- and intra- cluster traffic which is more performance intensive 
than jamming because of reactive jammer. The understanding of modelling of attacks and its 
evaluation gives the guidelines and requirements to design the efficient jamming 
countermeasure. 
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4 
Defence Mechanism 
against Jamming Attack 
 
This chapter discusses the classification of jamming 
countermeasures, comparison of available countermeasures and 
derives the open issues to develop efficient countermeasures. 
Threshold-based Jamming Countermeasure (TJC) with assumption 
made; working mechanism of algorithm and comparative simulation 
with result is presented. This chapter also overviews the game theory 
for WSN security and proposes the game formulation for jamming 
attack. It also proposes the jamming detection mechanism based on 
game theory concept. The proposed game theory-based simulation is 
compared with state of art solutions. The counter measure is 
developed for the proposed intelligent cluster-based jamming attack 
and it is compared with existing solutions. 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
WSN is a resource constraint network, whose performance is mainly dependent on, how 
efficiently the resources are used [1]. Its resource constraint nature makes it more prone to 
different security attacks at all WSN layer. The WSN is largely affected by the jamming 
attack, which happens at physical and MAC layer. Jamming attack reduces the performance 
of constraint-based network by increasing the unnecessary use of resources. Therefore, it is 
necessary to save the WSN from jamming attack. The different kinds of jamming are 
constant jamming, deceptive jamming, random jamming, and reactive jamming [2-4]. The 
chapter aims to find out the individual and combine solution for different jamming attack, if 
all kinds of jamming exist in a network. 
The chapter analyzes the different countermeasures on jamming attack. The literature survey 
shows that most of the solutions on jamming attack are hardware based which are quite 
expensive to implement and modify. The survey suggests that software based algorithm, is 
quite efficient and cost effective way, to stop the invasion of jamming attack. The researcher 
on jamming attack security did a major work for detecting the jamming attack and to reduce 
the effect of it on QoS of WSN by using some defensive strategies [5]. The defensive 
strategies can be useful to develop the efficient security model for Internet of Things (IoT) 
[6].  
The chapter first proposes the efficient defense mechanism against jamming attack by 
understanding the behavior of attacks and different available countermeasures. The chapter 
proposes the new countermeasure against reactive jamming i.e. TJC. The TJC algorithm 
allows the attack into the network and starts its defensive mechanism once it detects the 
assaults in a network. It uses threshold based mechanism to detect the attack and to cure it. 
Here, every node maintains some send threshold value and it compares current transmission 
with threshold periodically. If it goes beyond that threshold, it understands that an attack has 
happened and then it applies defensive mechanism. It first detects the jamming node, then 
informs all neighbouring node about jammer node and change all paths coming from jammed 
node i.e. it will put the jammer node out of network. The chapter also simulates the TJC 
algorithm using Network Simulator (NS) – 2 by considering realistic conditions. The 
simulation results show that TJC perform in better manner in existence of reactive jamming 
attack. It demonstrates good performance of TJC by varying traffic interval and number of 
malicious nodes in network. The major advantage of TJC is that its defensive mechanism 
supports with increased number of jamming nodes in a network. 
The second objective of the chapter is to form jamming model to understand the different 
jamming behavior in better way. The chapter uses the game theory for accomplishing the 
purpose. Game theory helps to understand the uncertainty and interdependencies in jamming 
attack [7]. The jamming model made considers the different player such as: constant jammer, 
deceptive jammer, random jammer, reactive jammer, and the monitor node. The monitor 
node considers two strategies continuous monitoring and periodic monitoring. Each kind of 
jammer behaves in different ways in different monitoring mechanism.  The other important 
objective of chapter concern with game theory is to find the Nash equilibrium condition for 
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players and to propose the efficient detection mechanism against all kind of jamming. A  
Nash equilibrium is a set of actions of the players such that, any other action chosen by a 
player does not result in more favourable utility for the players. Here, Nash equilibrium is 
form for jamming game, where none of the player has independent motivation to change the 
strategy. The proposed detection mechanism uses clustering of cross layer features for 
efficient detection of jamming. The approach helps to easily detect the normal and abnormal 
behavior in game, and to inform the network to take the particular action against jamming 
attack. The simulation result shows that the detection mechanism has better performance 
(energy consumption by 25-30%, delay, and throughput by 10-15%) in different realistic 
situations, as compared with existing optimal strategy solution. 
Chapter 3 proposed the new possibility of jamming attack in cluster based network i.e. 
intelligent CH jamming attack. This chapter derives the efficient defense mechanism against 
intelligent CH jamming attack by understanding the behavior of attacks and different 
available countermeasures for jamming attack. The chapter proposes the new threshold 
based-countermeasure against intelligent CH jamming attack. It allows the attack into the 
network and starts its defensive mechanism once it detects the assaults on a network. It uses 
threshold based mechanism to detect the attack and to cure it. Here, every node maintains 
some send threshold value and it compares current transmission with threshold periodically. 
If it goes beyond that threshold it understands that attack has happened and then it applies 
defensive mechanism. The mechanism maintains the threshold values at two different level 
one at CH level and another at base station (BS) level. It first detects the jamming node inside 
or outside the cluster, then informs all neighbouring node about jammer node and change all 
paths coming from jammed node i.e. it will put the jammer node out of clustered network. 
The simulation results show that proposed algorithm performs in a better manner in existence 
of intelligent CH jamming attack. It demonstrates good performance of algorithm by varying 
traffic interval and number of malicious nodes in network. The work is also verified with 
more realistic condition by considering random traffic interval with varying malicious nodes. 
4.2 Related Works 
 
The security countermeasures against jamming attack are classified [2] mainly into, 
• Detection techniques 
• Proactive countermeasures 
• Reactive countermeasures 
• Mobile agent-based countermeasures 
Detection Technique: The purpose of detection technique is to instantly detect jamming 
attacks. The approaches of these category cannot cope up with jamming alone; they can 
signiﬁcantly enhance jamming protection only when used in conjunction with other 
countermeasures by providing valuable data. 
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Proactive Countermeasures: The role of proactive countermeasures is to make a WSN 
immune to jamming attacks rather than reactively respond to such incidents. Proactive 
countermeasures can be classiﬁed in software i.e. algorithms for the detection of jamming or 
encryption of transmitted packets and combined software-hardware countermeasures. 
Reactive Countermeasures: The main characteristic of reactive countermeasures is that they 
enable reaction only upon the incident of a jamming attack, sensed by the WSN nodes. 
Reactive countermeasures can be further classiﬁed into software and combined software – 
hardware. 
Mobile-agent based countermeasures: This class of anti-jamming approaches enables 
Mobile Agents (MAs) to enhance the survivability of WSNs. The term MA refers to an 
autonomous program with the ability to move from host to host and act on behalf of users 
towards the completion of an assigned task. 
Table 4.1:  Survey of Jamming Attack Countermeasures 
Countermeasures 
Type of 
technique 
Mechanism Energy 
efficiency 
Implementation 
Cost 
The Feasibility of 
Launching and 
Detecting 
Jamming Attacks 
in WSNs [8] 
Detection 
Technique 
It detects the jamming 
using signal strength 
or location 
information. 
Low Low 
Radio Interference 
Detection Protocol 
(RID) [9] 
Detection 
Technique 
It uses the 
interference 
calculation method 
and information 
shared by the node.  
Medium High 
Energy-Efficient 
Link-Layer 
Jamming Attacks 
against WSN 
MAC Protocols 
[10] 
Proactive 
Software 
These techniques are 
mainly embedded 
inside the MAC to 
save from jamming 
effect. The techniques 
like high duty cycle, 
shorter data packets, 
encryption of link 
layer packet, TDMA 
protocol, and 
transmission in 
randomized interval 
are used to save from 
jamming.  
Medium Very Low 
Defeating Energy-
Efficient Jamming 
[11] 
Proactive 
Software 
It used frame 
masking, frequency 
hopping, and packet 
fragmentation with 
redundant encoding.  
High Medium 
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Hemes II nodes  
[12] 
Proactive 
hardware 
and 
software 
It is special kind of 
node which uses 
hybrid FHSS-DSSS 
technique.  
Medium High 
A Jammed-Area 
Mapping Service 
for Sensor 
Networks [13] 
Reactive 
Software 
It detects the jamming 
by mapping the jam 
area. 
Low Medium 
Channel surfing 
and spatial retreat 
[14] 
Reactive 
hardware 
and 
software 
It uses adaptive 
channel surfing 
techniques and spatial 
retreat mechanism. 
High High 
Wormhole-Based 
Anti-Jamming 
Techniques in 
Sensor Networks 
[15] 
Reactive 
hardware 
and 
software 
It uses mechanisms 
like wired pair nodes, 
frequency hopping 
pairs with 
uncoordinated 
channel hopping. 
Medium High 
Jamming Attack 
Detection and 
Countermeasures 
in WSN Using 
Ant System [16] 
Mobile 
Agent 
It used ant algorithm 
based mobility agent 
method. 
Low Medium 
An Algorithm for 
Data Fusion and 
Jamming 
Avoidance on 
WSNs [17] 
Mobile 
Agent 
It used data fusion 
mechanism to reduce 
the effect of jamming 
and trying to avoid 
permanently. 
Low Medium 
Optimal Jamming 
Attacks and 
Network Defense 
Policies in 
Wireless Sensor 
Networks [18] 
Proactive 
Software 
Detect the jamming 
by analyzing the 
percentage of 
collision and reduce 
the jamming effect by 
reducing the collision. 
Low Medium 
 
The survey in table 4.1 shows the different countermeasures against jamming attack. The 
table compares all the countermeasures according to the type of technique, mechanism used, 
its energy efficiency, and implementation cost. The survey gives a varying concluding remark 
on each kind of countermeasure. 
The detection techniques are less efficient according to total energy and implementation cost. 
Most of the detection technique cannot cope up with jamming attack individually; they 
require the support of some other countermeasures to work efficiently. The next kind of 
proactive mechanisms are better than the detection techniques by providing immunity 
solution to WSN against jamming attack. The proactive countermeasures are mainly 
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classified into proactive software countermeasures and proactive software plus hardware 
countermeasures. The survey shows that proactive software countermeasure techniques are 
more efficient than other used techniques because they use some algorithm to defense from 
jamming instead of allowing the jamming. The proactive countermeasures are efficient 
solution for active jamming attack such as constant jamming, deceptive jamming, and 
random jamming. The main disadvantage of proactive hardware plus software 
countermeasure is requirement of hardware, which increases its implementation cost.  
The reactive countermeasure technique shows good performance than proactive one in case 
of reactive jamming attack. Reactive countermeasure allows the jamming in a network and 
react immediately after the detection of jamming. They are also classified into reactive 
software and reactive software plus hardware countermeasures. Here, also reactive software 
approaches are much cost efficient and energy efficient than reactive hardware plus software 
countermeasures. The solution mainly concentrates on the software based reactive 
countermeasure against reactive jamming attack.  
The last kind of jamming countermeasure is mobile agent based countermeasures. It uses 
mobile agent who moves host to host to detect the jamming and to do the consigned task of 
counter-measuring against jamming attack. The major disadvantage of this technique is its 
increase requirement of mobile agent in network, which effects in decreasing efficiency and 
increase in implementation cost and complexity. 
4.3 TJC: Threshold based jamming countermeasures 
 
4.3.1 Network and Attacker Assumptions 
 
 Network consists of n sensor nodes and one base station (BS). 
 All nodes are connected together via bidirectional links. 
 The nodes are equipped with synchronized clock, omni-directional antenna and two-
ray ground propagation model. Each node is equipped with same capabilities.  
 Nodes may communicate directly using single-hop communication or it may 
communicate using multi-hop communication. 
 The nodes are distributed randomly in a network. 
 Each sensor node periodically sends a message to the BS. 
 The attack can be launch on any node in the network. 
 The type of jamming attack assumed is reactive jamming attack, which will be 
activated when the jammer detects the activity on any node in the network. 
 The jammer node is equipped same like a normal sensor node but with capability to 
generate random jamming signal (random messages).  
 
Chapter 4  Defense Mechanism against Jamming Attack 
 
76 
 
4.3.2 Working Mechanism of TJC 
 
This section proposes the threshold based jamming countermeasure (TJC). The key idea of 
algorithm is to enhance the performance of WSN in presence of reactive jamming attack and 
to save the WSN from harsh effects of reactive jamming. The algorithm saves the WSN by 
keeping some threshold at every node. The algorithm achieved it by introducing sending 
threshold which describe the maximum capabilities of node to send data. The detail flow of 
TJC algorithm is as shown in figure 4.1. 
 
Figure 4.1:  Flow of TJC algorithm 
The TJC algorithm works in two phases. The first phase in the threshold based jamming 
countermeasure is to decide the data sending threshold value of each node. The data sending 
threshold value is decided at BS side. Here, the BS has capabilities to count and maintain the 
record of the number of times data send from each node in WSN. Each node is sending the 
data towards the BS after regular interval, based on amount of data received from particular 
node per second during normal situation; BS decides the data sending threshold value of each 
node. BS will maintain the number of average send coming from each node as a sending 
threshold value. 
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In the second phase, algorithm will perform the check based on sending threshold value. 
Here, each node maintains the three states normal state, suspicious state and attacker state. 
The nodes in normal state are non-attacker node, suspicious state nodes are may be an 
attacker, and attacker state nodes are jamming node that started to destroy the network. 
Initially all nodes are in normal state. The nodes are sending their information to BS either 
through one-hop or multi-hop way. If the BS is getting more than expected data i.e. more 
than consigned threshold value from the particular source node then it is changing the state of 
node as suspicious state. The algorithm will do the path analysis for the suspicious state node; 
if the suspicious source node is the direct one-hop source then detection of attacker is easy 
just by doing one-hop path analysis. If the suspicious node is at multi-hop distance from BS 
then during path analysis phase, algorithm will check for individual node on path for its 
number of packet transmitted per second. If the number of packets generated by the nodes is 
more than the average send then that node is considered to be a jammer node and algorithm 
will make its state as jamming state. Once the jammer node will be detected then algorithm 
will remove the jammer node outside the path by changing the path through jamming node 
and also informed to the other neighbouring node to the network that, they have jammer node 
in neighbour.  
4.4 Simulation of TJC Algorithm and Result Discussion 
4.4.1 Implementation Details 
Table 4.2:  Simulation and node parameters 
Parameter Name Setting Used 
Network Interface type Wireless Physical:802.15.4 
Radio Propagation Model Two-Ray Ground 
Antenna Omni-directional antenna 
Channel Type Wireless Channel 
Link Layer Link Layer (LL) 
Interface Queue Priority Queue 
Buffer size of IFq 50 
MAC 802.15.4 
Routing Protocol Ad-hoc routing 
Energy Model EnergyModel 
Initial Energy (initialEnergy_) 100J 
Idle Power (idlePower_) 31mW 
Receiving Power (rxPower_) 35mW 
Transmission Power (txPower_) 31mW 
Sleep Power (sleepPower_) 15μW 
Number of nodes 100 
Node Placement Random 
Number of simulation runs 50 
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The implementation of all attack is performed by using discrete event simulator NS-2. The 
parameters set during simulations are shown in Table 4.2. The idle power, receiving power, 
transmission power, and sleep power are considered according to IEEE 802.15.4 radio model 
[19].  
The simulations are performed in two different conditions. The different conditions are, 
 WSN with reactive jamming attack 
 WSN with reactive jamming attack with TJC countermeasure 
The simulation of jamming attacks is done under following considerations, 
 The simulation is performed by varying traffic interval, which is useful to measure the 
performance of attack and its countermeasures under various traffic conditions. The 
traffic interval is varied from 1s to 10s. The 1s traffic interval is consider as fast 
traffic and 10s traffic interval is consider as slow traffic. These simulations consider 
number of malicious nodes in network or nodes under attack is one. 
 The second set of simulation is performed by varying number of malicious nodes in 
the network. The number of malicious nodes in network considered is 1,2,4,8 and 16. 
The traffic interval considers under this simulation is 1s which is considered to be the 
fast traffic in network. These set of simulations will be useful to analyse the effect of 
attack and its countermeasures by increasing the destructive entities in a network. 
 The third set of simulation is performed by considering some realistic situations 
where each node is not transmitting information at same time and traffic interval 
consider is random traffic interval which varies in between 1s to 10s randomly.  
 The last set of simulation is performed by adding random mobility to all nodes in the 
network. The simulation considers the random traffic interval which varies in between 
1s to 10s randomly. The mobility speed consider here varies from 1km/hr to 25km/hr. 
This set of simulations gives the more realistic behavior of the algorithm by 
considering random mobility and traffic interval. 
4.4.2 Result Discussions 
A. Performance by varying traffic interval 
Figure 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 shows the measurement of average energy consumption, delay, and 
throughput by varying the traffic interval respectively. The graphs show that the proposed 
TJC algorithm improves the energy consumption, delay, and throughput under reactive 
jamming attack conditions. The algorithm detects the jamming attack by analyzing the 
network and reduces the effect of jamming attack by separating the jamming node from the 
network.  
The energy consumption shown in figure 4.2 is less after applying TJC algorithm than normal 
reactive jamming situation. The major reason for enhancing the energy efficiency in TJC is 
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detection of reactive jammer and to place it out of the network. It will help to save the energy 
consumption that happen due to reactive jamming attack.  
Figure 4.3 shows that the delay after applying TJC in a WSN is less than reactive jamming 
situation because TJC detects the jamming node in network and stop it by keeping it out of 
the network. The removal of jamming node helps to remove jam on channel, which gives the 
availability of channel to each node and helps in reduction of delay in case of TJC. In reactive 
jamming situation, which make channel busy for long time and incur a large waiting time for 
each node, the busy state of channel effects on to the throughput of the network, which is 
improved after applying TJC algorithm as shown in figure 4.4. 
 
Figure 4.2: Comparative Energy Consumption Analysis of Reactive jamming and TJC under 
varying traffic interval 
 
Figure 4.3: Comparative Delay Analysis of Reactive jamming and TJC under varying traffic 
interval 
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Figure 4.4: Comparative Throughput Analysis of Reactive jamming and TJC under varying 
traffic interval 
B.Performance by varying number of malicious nodes 
Figure 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7 describes the average energy consumption, delay, and throughput by 
changing the number of jamming nodes in the network. The number of jamming nodes in 
network is increasing from 1 to 16. The figures show that TJC algorithm improves 
performance against reactive jamming as the number of jamming nodes in network is 
increasing. The increasing number of jamming nodes in network gives more realistic analysis 
and adaptivity of TJC if amount of jamming is increasing in the network. The TJC shows 
efficiency by detecting the multiple jamming on the single path, which shows its perfection to 
cure the attack. 
 
Figure 4.5:  Comparative Energy consumption analysis of Reactive jamming and TJC with 
varying number of malicious nodes 
Figure 4.5 show the average energy consumption by varying number of malicious nodes in a 
network, which shows TJC outperforms as number of malicious nodes is increasing. The 
major reason of energy saving in case of TJC is its jamming detection mechanism which 
helps to reduce the energy consumption due to jamming node and also helps to reduce the 
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energy consumption due to active state of large number of nodes in WSN without sending 
any data to destination. The detection mechanism of TJC also helps to reduce delay and 
enhance throughput as shown in figure 5.5 and 5.6. TJC reduce the delay by reducing the 
channel waiting time and increase throughput by giving quick channel availability to nodes in 
presence of reactive jamming.   
 
Figure 4.6:  Comparative Delay analysis of Reactive jamming and TJC with varying number 
of malicious nodes 
 
Figure 4.7: Comparative Throughput analysis of Reactive jamming and TJC with varying 
number of malicious nodes 
C. Performance of TJC in realistic conditions 
Figure 4.8, 4.9, and 4.10 shows the performance of TJC in more realistic situations such as by 
keeping random interval between the data packets and by transmitting data at different time 
instead of sending data at same time from each node. The realistic situation gives the more 
insight picture of performance of TJC in presence of reactive jamming attack.  
Figure 4.8 show the average energy consumption of reactive jamming with and without TJC 
algorithm by varying number of malicious nodes. It shows that energy efficiency improves 
after applying TJC in realistic situations too because of technique it uses. The technique used 
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by TJC helps to reduce delay and enhances the throughput as shown in figure 4.9 and 4.10 
respectively. The major reason of performance improvement in TJC is because of efficient 
channel availability than reactive jamming. 
 
Figure 4.8: Comparative Energy consumption analysis of Reactive jamming and TJC in 
realistic conditions 
 
Figure 4.9: Comparative Delay analysis of Reactive jamming and TJC in realistic conditions 
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Figure 4.10: Comparative Throughput analysis of Reactive jamming and TJC in realistic 
conditions 
D. Performance of TJC by considering mobility 
Figure 4.11, 4.12, and 4.13 shows the measurement of average- energy consumption, delay, 
and throughput respectively by varying the number of malicious nodes in the network. The 
result shown gives more truthful support to the presented work because the measurement 
considers the random mobility among the nodes with random traffic interval. The mobility 
include in simulation consider the random waypoint mobility model [20]. The mobility 
scenario helps to check the adaptability of the concern countermeasure in presence of 
mobility among normal and malicious nodes.  
 
Figure 4.11: Comparative Energy consumption analysis of Reactive jamming and TJC by 
considering mobility 
The figures shows that as the number of malicious nodes are increasing in the network 
average- energy consumption and delays are also increasing with it. The major reason of 
introducing higher energy consumption and delay is mobility. The mobility among the nodes 
will take more time to calculate the threshold values for each node, require more energy to 
scan the path and to detect the location of malicious- and neighbouring- nodes among it. 
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These reasons lead to increase in energy consumption and delay, they also effects on to the 
reduction of throughput by increasing the time of jamming detection.          
 
 
Figure 4.12: Comparative Delay analysis of Reactive jamming and TJC by considering 
mobility 
 
Figure 4.13: Comparative Throughput analysis of Reactive jamming and TJC by considering 
mobility 
4.5 Game Theorotic Modelling and Defense Mechanism  
4.5.1 Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Network 
Game theory is a theory of decision making under conditions of uncertainty and 
interdependence. A game has three components: a set of players, a set of possible actions for 
each player, and a set of strategies. A player’s strategy is a complete plan of actions to be 
taken when the game is actually played. Players can act selﬁshly to maximize their gains and 
hence a distributed strategy for players can provide an optimized solution to the game. In any 
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game, utility represents the motivation of players. A utility function, describing player’s 
preferences for a given player assigns a number for every possible outcome of the game with 
the property that a higher number implies that the outcome is more preferred. The higher the 
number of participating nodes, the higher will be the utility [21].  
A Nash equilibrium is a set of actions of the players such that, any other action chosen by a 
player does not result in more favourable utility for the players. The games can be classified 
into non-cooperative games and cooperative games. In non-cooperative games, every node 
act selﬁshly, to minimize their individual utility in a distributed decision-making 
environment. This is in contrast to cooperative games where nodes agree on pre-mediated 
strategies to maximize their payoffs [21]. 
In WSNs involving non-cooperative energy-efficiency games, nodes can act selﬁshly to 
conserve their power by refusing to participate as relays in multi-hop networks. In doing so, a 
node conserves its power; however the nodes involved in transmission and reception of the 
message have already used a fraction of their power and decreased their lifetime. The utility 
function for the nodes is the savings in battery power achieved by not cooperating in packet 
forwarding of other nodes. Another utility function [22] is the mapping of number of sensor 
nodes participating in a sensory computation to a number. Such selﬁsh nodes can be 
encouraged to participate in communication by offering incentives. Incentives for the case of 
wireless sensor networks could be tokens, in the form of reputation or monetary beneﬁts. 
4.5.2 Game Theory for WSN Security 
In security-oriented games malicious nodes within the network might launch an active attack 
on other nodes in the WSN, where the objective of the malicious nodes is to disrupt network 
operation without consideration for their own lifetime. Another category of attacks are 
passive attacks, where malicious nodes prevent broadcast messages and other service-
availability related messages from reaching other nodes in the network [23]. Game theory 
offers ways to formulate problems posed by selﬁsh and/or malicious nodes; it can serve as a 
favourable tool for analysis of WSNs, wherein, optimizing energy consumption in various 
node activities and enabling secure network operation can be modelled as games with nodes 
as the players. 
Game theory offers models to capture the interaction between players, in this case, nodes, by 
modelling the players as components of social networks, where players can act in ways that 
would maximize their own utility, which does not always lead to favourable outcomes for the 
game. While game theory still lets players choose the best available action, it provides a 
situation where other player’s utilities are also maximized. Possible techniques to relate game 
theory to jamming attacks so as to find out a secure defensive mechanism for jamming 
attacks: 
 Pruning Technique 
 Nash equilibrium technique 
 Bayesian theoretic technique 
 Repetitive Theoretic technique 
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Table 4.3: Various securities related game theoretic approaches [7, 23, 24] 
Types of attack Defense Strategy Ideal Strategy Payoff Function 
External intruder: 
Attacks most 
vulnerable node in 
the network 
IDS protects clusters 
of nodes 
from the intruder 
IDS protects the 
same cluster 
which the intruder 
attacks 
Function of utility, 
cost of defending/ 
protecting a cluster 
External intruder: 
Injects malicious 
packet in the 
network 
Service provider tries 
to detect 
malicious packets by 
sampling 
network ﬂows at 
various links 
Sampling strategy 
should be 
greater than the 
maximum ﬂow of 
packets 
Function of the 
probability of 
detecting a 
malicious packet 
External attacker: 
Causes nodes to 
turn malicious by 
causing them 
to prevent broadcast 
messages 
from reaching other 
nodes 
A certain subset of 
nodes, unknown to 
attackers sends 
acknowledgement to 
the base 
station for the 
broadcast 
messages 
Detect attacked 
nodes so that 
attacker payoff goes 
to zero 
Attacker payoff is 
proportional to the 
number of nodes 
deprived of the 
broadcast messages 
Internal: Malicious 
nodes do not 
forward incoming 
packets 
Introduce reputation 
ratings for 
collaboration between 
nodes 
Catch nodes in the 
process of being 
malicious, i.e. while 
dropping packets 
Function of a discount 
factor times the 
previous payoff 
Internal: Malicious 
nodes in mobile 
WSNs do not 
forward 
incoming packets 
Maintain good 
cooperation, 
reputation and quality 
of security ratings at 
each node 
Nodes cooperate 
only if there has 
been a good history 
of cooperation, 
reputation and 
quality of security, 
otherwise they 
defect 
Function of the 
distance between 
nodes, number of 
packets forwarded 
and received, quality 
of service of trafﬁc as 
a % of exposed trafﬁc 
when security is 
compromised 
 
4.5.3 Game role definition in different jamming attacks 
This section explains the game role definition of different jamming attacks. This game role 
definition will be helpful to define the detail game model for each attack. Table 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 
4.7 shows the game role definitions for constant jamming, deceptive jamming, random 
jamming and reactive jamming respectively. 
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Table 4.4: Game role definition of constant jamming 
Player Wireless Node Constant Jammer 
Strategy Sense the channel and send data 
packet 
Send random data packet after some 
regular interval without following 
communication rules. 
Reward Successful packet delivery with less 
collision in network. No jamming in 
network. 
Introducing the collision in network, 
increasing the energy consumption, 
reducing the throughput of network 
Cost Energy required for sensing the 
channel and sending the packet. 
Required extra energy for 
retransmission if packet is loss or 
collide because of jamming. 
Consume energy to create noise packet 
in regular interval. 
 
Table 4.5: Game role definition of deceptive jamming 
Player Wireless Node Deceptive Jammer 
Strategy Sense the channel and send data 
packet 
Send regular packets continuously 
without checking availability of 
channel. 
Reward Successful packet delivery with less 
collision in network. No jamming in 
network. 
Jam the network by making channel 
busy for long time, place most of the 
node in network in receive mode 
Cost Energy required for sensing the 
channel and sending the packet. 
Required extra energy for 
retransmission if packet is loss or 
collide because of jamming. 
Consumes high amount of energy for 
producing packets continuously. 
 
Table 4.6: Game role definition of random jamming 
Player Wireless Node Random Jammer 
Strategy Sense the channel and send data 
packet 
Send regular packets continuously 
without checking availability of 
channel or send random data packet 
after some regular interval without 
following communication rules. Goes 
to sleep mode to save the energy. 
Reward Successful packet delivery with less 
collision in network. No jamming in 
network. 
Place most of the node in network in 
receive mode, Introducing the collision 
in network, increasing the energy 
consumption, reducing the throughput 
of network 
Cost Energy required for sensing the 
channel and sending the packet. 
Required extra energy for 
retransmission if packet is loss or 
collide because of jamming. 
Consumes energy intelligently by 
placing node in sleep mode. 
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Table 4.7: Game role definition of reactive jamming 
Player Wireless Node Reactive Jammer 
Strategy Sense the channel and send data 
packet 
Generate noise packet only when sense 
the activity on channel otherwise put 
himself in quiet state. 
Reward Successful packet delivery with less 
collision in network. No jamming in 
network. 
Introduce collision and increase the 
energy consumption in network. 
Cost Energy required for sensing the 
channel and sending the packet. 
Required extra energy for 
retransmission if packet is loss or 
collide because of jamming. 
Consumes energy only when 
transmitting packets. 
4.5.4 Jamming Game Formulation 
Jamming can be formulated as a game between two players - the jammer and the 
communicator (transmitter-receiver pair) with different objectives. Jammers are players who 
prevent and deny wireless channel access to regular users by jamming their communication. 
Communicator nodes are players whose objective is to utilize the wireless channel effectively 
to increase their overall throughput. Here the game can also be model as the game between 
jammer and monitor node where the monitor nodes are players responsible for detecting the 
jamming attack. 
The jamming attack and detection is model as a two-player, non-cooperative, and zero sum 
game. The player set as J = {J1, J2}, where J1 is the monitor node and J2 is the jammer. The 
nodes can choose to continuously monitor (Mc) the wireless channel or perform periodic 
monitoring (Mp) for a predeﬁned time interval. The tradeoffs in the proposed jamming game 
are: continuous monitoring can detect jamming but results in high energy consumption; 
periodic monitoring consumes less energy, but with the potential risk of missing the attack. 
The jammer can have multiple attack strategies. The game adopts following jamming 
strategies constant jammer, deceptive jammer, random jammer and reactive jammer. 
Let us denote CJ, DJ, RJ and ReJ represent constant jamming, deceptive jamming, random 
jamming and reactive jamming actions. The action set for the monitoring node consists of 
two strategies with different monitoring durations (Mc, Mp), while jammer strategies are CJ, 
DJ, RJ and ReJ. Let us denote the strategy set as S = S1 × S2, where S1= {Mc, Mp} for 
Player 1 and S2= {CJ, DJ, RJ, ReJ} for Player 2. 
The utility function represents the objective of the player. For monitoring nodes, two possible 
utility functions can be considered – detection rate and false positive rate. The utility 
functions indicate the efficiency of the monitoring node in terms of number of attacks 
successfully detected and the number of falsely classiﬁed attacks. The objective of jammer 
node in the network is to prevent transmissions in the channel. Hence it launches a denial of 
service attack aimed at reducing the throughput of the network. From the jammer’s point of 
view, this is equivalent to its attack success. The utility function for the jammer can hence be 
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deﬁned as the success in attack expansion. The utility function is denoted as {U} = {U1, U2}, 
where U1 =detection rate and U2 = attack gain. 
Consider the above notations for strategic game form, 
 Gd is the gain of detecting the attack. 
 t be the time for periodic monitoring. 
 AD is the attack duration. 
 Pc and Pp be the cost or payoff for attack detection using continuous and periodic 
monitoring. 
 Ga is the attacker gain for successfully launching an attack. 
 Pcj, Pdj and Prej are the payoffs or costs of attacking for the constant-, deceptive- and 
reactive- jammers.  
 Ts is sleep time for jammer node. 
 Ti is the interval for generating jamming packet. 
 
Table 4.8: Strategies in game 
 Continuous Monitor Periodic Monitor 
CJ Ti (Ga - Pcj), Ti (Gd- Pc ) Ti(Ga – Pcj), tTi (Gd – Pp) 
DJ (Ga – Pdj), (Gd- Pc ) (Ga – Pdj), t(Gd – Pp) 
RJ Ti (Ga - Pcj), Ti (Gd- Pc ), (Ga – Pdj), (Gd- 
Pc ) 
Ti(Ga – Pcj), tTi (Gd – Pp), (Ga – Pdj), t(Gd – 
Pp) 
ReJ AD(Ga - Prej), (Gd- Pc) AD(tGa - Prej), t(ADGd– Pp) 
 
Table 4.8 shows the strategies of game for continuous monitoring and periodic monitoring. 
The table considers four different players in game, constant jammer (CJ), deceptive jammer 
(DJ), random jammer (RJ) and reactive jammer (ReJ). Each player has different strategies for 
continuous and periodic monitoring. The strategies are explained as follows, 
 Constant Jammer: The constant jammer sends the random packets after some 
particular fixed interval Ti. During continuous monitoring strategies will be, it gain 
Ga if attack is successfully launched and for launching the attack it has to pay Pcj 
cost i.e. Ga - Pcj. Another strategy will work if attack is detected, during that for 
detecting the attack it has to gain Gd and for it the payoff will be Pc i.e. Gd - Pc. Both 
of these strategies will work after fixed interval Ti.  
During periodic monitoring, the first strategy will be same like the continuous 
monitoring. The second strategy will be, for obtaining gain Gd for detection the node 
has to pay Pp i.e. Gd – Pp and it will happen periodically with some fixed interval tTi.  
 Deceptive Jammer: The deceptive jammer sends the packet continuously without 
checking for channel. During continuous monitoring DJ can gain the Ga and Gd 
alternatively by paying the cost Pdj or Pc respectively. In periodic monitoring the DJ 
can gain Ga by paying cost Pdj, while it can gain Gd by paying Pp after some period t. 
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 Random Jammer: The random jammer uses the combine strategies of constant 
jammer and deceptive jammer. The different strategies of random jammer are as 
shown in table 4.8. 
 Reactive Jammer: The reactive jammer reacts only when it senses any event on the 
channel, we can say the duration in which reactive jammer reacts or attack as attack 
duration AD. In continuous monitoring reactive jammer can achieve the gain Ga by 
paying cost Prej during attack duration AD, otherwise it gain Gd by paying cost of 
continuous monitoring Pc. During periodic monitoring the ReJ can gain Ga with 
period t by paying Prej in every attack duration AD, else it can gain Gd in every AD by 
paying Pp after period t.     
4.5.5 Equilibrium Conditions 
This section investigates the Nash Equilibrium for the jamming game where none of the 
player has independent motivation to change the strategy. In jamming game each player is 
trying to maximize their payoff utilities. The payoff can be maximized by using mixed 
strategies which is probability distribution over set of strategies. Consider, m be the 
probability of continuous monitoring the channel and (1-m) be the probability of using 
periodic monitoring. For calculating the equilibrium conditions consider that if interval for 
jamming in case of constant and random jamming is too small, which is almost equal to the 
continuous jamming i.e. deceptive jamming. Therefore, j be the probability to jam channel 
constantly, deceptively or randomly and (1-j) be the probability to jam the channel reactively. 
Hence, the Nash Equilibrium condition (m*, j*) for the game will be, 
    
         
       
 
    
        
         
 
Here, m* and j* are proportional to the attack cost and detection cost respectively. The 
equilibrium point shows that the monitoring probability using continuous strategy is reliant 
on the attack gain. When the channel sense the large number of events then frequency of 
reactive jamming is more frequent and the cost of attacking is close to constant jamming. 
Therefore, the best response for the monitor node is to choose continuous monitoring 
strategy. The equilibrium probability of jammer is proportional to monitor’s detection gain. 
When the monitor has a high detection rate the probability of jammer using continuous 
monitoring decreases. Therefore the jammer’s equilibrium strategy is dependent on the cost 
of periodic monitor. When the monitor deploys periodic monitoring frequently, the best 
response for the jammer is to constantly jam the channel to increase its attack success. 
4.5.6 Detection Mechanism for Jamming Attack 
The detection mechanism for the monitor node considers the clustering approach. The 
clustering is one of the efficient and suitable solutions to detect the intruder in real time 
detection mechanism. It takes an unsupervised learning approach and do not require the prior 
knowledge of concern entities and its instances. 
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The jamming attack can be efficiently detected by understanding the cross-layer features. 
Here, the clustering algorithm is used to analyze the cross-layer features. The different cross 
layer feature consider for the efficient detection are retransmitted RTS or DATA, failure of 
carrier sense and network allocator vector (NAV). These different features values decide the 
level of jamming in the network. During most of jamming attack the node want to do 
communication, get channel busy in that case failure of carries sense is important feature to 
be consider. In some case of jamming the values of RTS and data determines the level of 
contention. NAV is important indicator for the occupancy of channel. Clustering will be used 
to monitor the decision when attack takes place in the network. 
Here, consider that there are two clusters: one is normal and another is abnormal. The object 
near to the normal cluster is considered as normal and the object near to abnormal cluster will 
be abnormal. This means that, there is use of two different set of features one in normal set of 
features and another is abnormal set of features. 
Consider a sampling interval of pt seconds. If the monitor node is on during the sampling 
period, the action of attack is determined when the feature set is classiﬁed as abnormal, and 
no attack is determined if the feature set is classiﬁed as normal. It is evident that accurate 
detection of the attack is dependent on the relation between sampling period and the current 
monitoring strategy. The choice of pt determines the efficiency of the detection mechanism. 
For a monitoring duration of t seconds, clustering analysis performs better with more cross 
layer feature samples. If the sampling period pt<<t, the number of feature samples collected 
may not be sufficient for accurate detection. With a large pt value it obtain more samples, and 
hence a higher detection rate.  
Since multiple features are observed over a period of time, it can also reduce the number of 
outliers signiﬁcantly thus reducing false positives. On the other hand, it must ensure that pt 
does not exceed the monitoring duration time. Also, there is a signiﬁcant correlation between 
attack duration and monitoring interval. If the monitor is on during the sampling interval and 
there is no attack, clustering utilizes the observed cross-layer features and precisely identiﬁes 
the set as normal. However in case of a smart jammer initiating reactive jamming attack, if 
the monitor is not activated during the attack, it misses the attack. Hence, it observes that the 
overall detection gain is contingent on the feature sampling rate, attack duration and 
monitoring duration. 
4.5.7 Implementation Details and Results 
A. Implementation Details 
The implementation is performed by using discrete event simulator NS-2 (Network 
Simulator-2) [25]. The parameters set during simulations are shown in Table 4.9. The idle 
power, receiving power, transmission power, and sleep power are considered according to 
IEEE 802.15.4 radio model [19].  
The simulations are performed in three different conditions. The different conditions are, 
 WSN without any security attack 
Chapter 4  Defense Mechanism against Jamming Attack 
 
92 
 
 WSN with game theory based detection mechanism 
 WSN with optimal detection strategy [18] 
The implementation of game theory based detection mechanism and optimal strategy based 
detection is performed by considering all attack conditions. 
The simulation of jamming attacks is done under following consideration, 
 The simulation is performed by varying traffic interval, which is useful to measure the 
performance of attack and its countermeasures under various traffic conditions. The 
traffic interval is varied from 1s to 10s. The 1s traffic interval is consider as fast 
traffic and 10s traffic interval is consider as slow traffic.  
 The second set of simulation is performed by varying number of malicious nodes in 
the network which shows the realistic performance of network when network consist 
of one or more than one jamming attacker. The number of malicious nodes in network 
considered is 1,2,4,8 and 16. The traffic interval considered under this simulation is 1s 
which is consider being the fast traffic in network. These set of simulations will be 
useful to analyze the effect of attack and its countermeasures by increasing the 
destructive entities in network. 
Table 4.9: Simulation and node parameters 
Parameter Name Setting Used 
Network Interface type Wireless Physical:802.15.4 
Radio Propagation Model Two-Ray Ground 
Antenna Omni-directional antenna 
Channel Type Wireless Channel 
Link Layer Link Layer (LL) 
Interface Queue Priority Queue 
Buffer size of IFq 50 
MAC 802.15.4 
Routing Protocol Ad-hoc routing 
Energy Model EnergyModel 
Initial Energy (initialEnergy_) 100J 
Idle Power (idlePower_) 31mW 
Receiving Power (rxPower_) 35mW 
Transmission Power (txPower_) 31mW 
Sleep Power (sleepPower_) 15μW 
Number of nodes 100 
Node Placement Random 
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B. Results and Discussion 
-Measurement by varying interval 
Figure 4.14, 4.15, and 4.16 shows the comparative evaluation of no attack condition, game 
theory solution, and optimal detection strategy by varying the traffic interval. The 
comparative evaluation considers the measurement of three parameters average- energy 
consumption, delay, and throughput.  
 
Figure 4.14:Comparative Energy Consumption Analysis of No Attack condition, Game 
theory solution and Optimal strategy under varying traffic interval 
 
Figure 4.15: Comparative Delay Analysis of No Attack condition, Game theory solution and 
Optimal strategy under varying traffic interval 
Figure 4.14 shows the average comparative energies of three different conditions. It gives the 
conclusion that the game theory solution reduces energy consumption in presence of attacks 
than optimal strategy based solution. The main reason for showing efficiency in terms of 
energy is its game theory based cross layer based detection mechanism which helps to detect 
jamming earlier and reduce the losses. Another benefit of game theoretic solution on optimal 
strategy based solution is it tries to achieve the equilibrium conditions, which helps to 
Chapter 4  Defense Mechanism against Jamming Attack 
 
94 
 
maintain synergy among the involved nodes. This synergy helps to improve the energy 
consumption.  
 
 
Figure 4.16: Comparative Throughput Analysis of No Attack condition, Game theory 
solution and Optimal strategy under varying traffic interval 
Figure 4.15 and 4.16 gives the comparative average- delay and throughput respectively. The 
game theoretic solution shows the reduced average delay and increased throughput over 
another compared solution. The game theoretic solution reduces the chances of false 
detection by using multiple different strategies and tries to achieve equilibrium over multiple 
moves. The reduced chances of false detection help to improve the average- delay and 
throughput of the game theoretic solution. The use of multiple features to detect the attack is 
also useful to reduce the false detection and benefited by reducing delay and increased 
throughput.            
-Measurement by varying number of malicious nodes 
 
Figure 4.17: Comparative Energy consumption analysis of Game theory solution and Optimal 
strategy with varying number of malicious nodes 
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Figure 4.17, 4.18, and 4.19 shows the average- energy consumption, delay, and throughput of 
the game theory solution and optimal strategy by changing the number of malicious nodes in 
a network. The variation in number of malicious nodes shows the more accurate situation in 
network where network consist of more than one malicious nodes and it keeps on increasing 
as attack penetrate in network. The scenario is made more realistic by introducing the 
different jamming behavior for each node which select randomly whenever jamming is 
activated. 
 
Figure 4.18:Comparative Delay analysis of Game theory solution and Optimal strategy with 
varying number of malicious nodes 
 
 
Figure 4.19: Comparative Throughput analysis of Game theory solution and Optimal strategy 
with varying number of malicious nodes 
The graph concludes that the game theory solution shows better results in all three conditions 
over the optimal strategy by considering more realism in simulation. The major reasons for 
improving performance are use of cross layer features, reduction in possibility of false 
detection and cooperation among nodes to achieve equilibrium condition during game play. 
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The performance of optimal strategy is reduced by introducing the tradeoff between severity 
of attack and possibility that it can be detectable and the considered optimal model is also not 
good when the amount of attack keep on increasing in network. 
4.6 Defense against Cluster based Jamming 
4.6.1 Defense Mechanism 
The countermeasure for cluster head jamming attack can be developed by extending TJC 
mechanism where BS maintains the data sending threshold value of each node [26]. If the BS 
gets more than expected data which is higher than consigned threshold value from the 
particular source node then it is making that node as suspicious node. The algorithm analyses 
the path if the source node is not the direct one-hop source. 
The TJC algorithm is extended by distributing the responsibility of the BS among different 
CH. The threshold values are maintained at two different levels. Level 1 will be at CH side 
and level 2 will be at BS side.  
 Level 1: The level 1 is useful to control the jamming inside the cluster i.e. it is useful 
for detecting the intra-cluster jamming. Here, the CH maintains the data sending 
threshold value for each node inside the cluster. If the CH is getting more than expected 
packets then it will not aggregate the information and it will perform the path analysis 
inside the cluster, find out the malicious jamming node in the cluster and reroute all the 
paths going via jamming node.  
 Level 2: The level 2 is useful to control the jamming in between the CH i.e. for 
controlling inter-cluster jamming. Here, the BS maintains the aggregated data sending 
threshold value for each CH. If the BS gets more than expected data from the CHs then 
it will declare that path as suspicious path and do the path analysis for detecting the 
malicious CH in the network. If the malicious CH is being detected, then that will be 
declared as jamming node and rerouting will be done for transmitting information in-
between the CHs and BS. The re-election of CH will be done for getting new CH in 
cluster. 
Figure 4.20 explain the flow of proposed countermeasure for intelligent CH-jamming attack. 
The algorithm start with the decision of threshold values TH. It decides the threshold values- 
at CH for level 1 and at BS for level 2. Level 1 is for controlling intra-cluster communication 
and level 2 is for controlling inter-cluster communication. The CH and BS will check after 
regular intervals for send data (SD) and TH values for each node. If SD is greater than TH 
either during inter- or intra- cluster communication, then CH or BS analyze the each node on 
path for its SD value coming to CH or BS. The path analysis will be done by comparing 
individual SD of each node with TH. If any node on path having SD greater than TH, then 
algorithm declares that node as jamming node, either inside or outside the cluster.  
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Figure 4.20:  Flowchart of proposed countermeasure 
4.6.2 Comparative Simulation and Discussion 
4.6.2.1 Simulation Details 
The implementation is performed by using discrete event simulator NS-2 (Network 
Simulator-2). The parameters set during simulations are shown in Table 4.10. The idle power, 
receiving power, transmission power, and sleep power are considered according to IEEE 
802.15.4 radio model [19].  
The simulations are performed in four different conditions. The different conditions are, 
1. WSN with intelligent CH jamming attack 
2. WSN with countermeasure for CH jamming attack 
3. WSN with TJC countermeasure 
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4. WSN with optimal strategy based countermeasure 
The simulations are performed by considering following scenarios, 
 The simulation is performed by varying traffic interval, which is useful to measure the 
performance of attack and its countermeasures under various traffic conditions. The 
traffic interval is varied from 1s to 10s. The 1s traffic interval is considered as fast 
traffic and 10s traffic interval is considered as slow traffic. 
 The second set of simulation is performed by varying number of malicious nodes. The 
number of malicious nodes in network considered is 1,2,4,8 and 16. The traffic 
interval considered under this simulation is 1s which is consider being the fast traffic 
in a network. These set of simulations will be useful to analyze the effect of attack and 
its countermeasures by increasing the destructive entities in network. 
 The third set of simulation is performed by considering some realistic situation where 
each node is not transmitting information at same time and traffic interval considered 
is random traffic interval which varies in between 1s to 10s randomly. 
Table 4.10:  Simulation and node parameters 
Parameter Name Setting Used 
Network Interface type Wireless Physical:802.15.4 
Radio Propagation Model Two-Ray Ground 
Antenna Omni-directional antenna 
Channel Type Wireless Channel 
Link Layer Link Layer (LL) 
Interface Queue Priority Queue 
Buffer size of IFq 50 
MAC 802.15.4 
Routing Protocol Ad-hoc routing 
Energy Model EnergyModel 
Initial Energy (initialEnergy_) 100J 
Idle Power (idlePower_) 31mW 
Receiving Power (rxPower_) 35mW 
Transmission Power (txPower_) 31mW 
Sleep Power (sleepPower_) 15μW 
Number of nodes 100 
Node Placement Random 
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4.6.2.2 Results and Discussions 
A. Measurement by varying interval 
 
Figure 4.21: Comparative Energy Consumption Analysis of Intelligent CH jamming Attack, 
Countermeasure on CH Jamming Attack, TJC and Optimal strategy under varying traffic 
interval 
 
Figure 4.22: Comparative Delay Analysis of Intelligent CH jamming Attack, Countermeasure 
on CH Jamming Attack, TJC and Optimal strategy under varying traffic interval 
Figure 4.21, 4.22, and 4.23 shows the energy consumption, delay, and throughput 
respectively for intelligent CH jamming attack, its countermeasure, TJC algorithm and 
optimal game theoretic strategy. The clustering algorithm used for formation of cluster is 
LEACH [27, 28]. All three results show the performance enhancement after applying the 
countermeasure against the intelligent CH jamming attack. The main reason for performance 
enhancement is that the mechanism detects inter- and intra- cluster jamming and avoid the 
jamming by removing the jamming node or by rerouting the network without considering the 
jamming node. The proposed countermeasure is also compared with TJC algorithm which is 
the countermeasure for reactive jamming attack; it shows lower performance than proposed 
one. Here, TJC is implemented to detect intelligent CH jamming attack, which shows lower 
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performance than proposed countermeasure. The TJC algorithm is insufficient to detect the 
intelligent CH jamming attack which takes place in and out of the cluster. The comparison of 
proposed algorithm is also performed with optimal game theoretic strategy. The optimal 
game theoretic strategy is insufficient to efficiently detect CH jamming attack. This technique 
involves large number of calculation which increase the overheads and increase the 
implementation cost. 
 
Figure 4.23 : Comparative Throughput analysis of Intelligent CH jamming Attack, 
Countermeasure on CH Jamming Attack, TJC and Optimal strategy under varying traffic 
interval 
B. Measurement by varying number of malicious nodes 
 
Figure 4.24:Comparative Energy consumption analysis of Intelligent CH jamming Attack, 
Countermeasure on CH Jamming Attack, TJC and Optimal strategy with varying number of 
malicious nodes 
Figure 4.24, 4.25, and 4.26 describes the average energy consumption, delay, and throughput 
by changing the number of malicious nodes in the network. The number of malicious nodes 
are increasing from 1 to 16. The figures shows that proposed countermeasure on CH jamming 
attack is showing improvement against intelligent CH jamming attack, existing 
countermeasure TJC and optimal strategy. The increasing number of malicious nodes in a 
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network gives more realistic analysis and adaptivity of proposed countermeasure, if amount 
of intelligent CH jamming is increasing in the network. The proposed countermeasure shows 
efficiency by detecting the multiple intelligent CH jamming attack on the single path, which 
shows its perfection to cure the attack. 
 
Figure 4.25:Comparative Delay  analysis of Intelligent CH jamming Attack, Countermeasure 
on CH Jamming Attack, TJC and Optimal strategy with varying number of malicious nodes 
 
Figure 4.26:Comparative Throughput analysis of Intelligent CH jamming Attack, 
Countermeasure on CH Jamming Attack, TJC and Optimal strategy with varying number of 
malicious nodes 
Figure 4.24 shows the average energy consumption by varying number of malicious nodes in 
a network, which shows the proposed countermeasure outperforms over other approches. The 
major reason of energy saving in proposed countermeasure is its intelligent CH jamming 
detection mechanism. It helps to reduce the energy consumption due to jamming node or CH 
and also helps to reduce the energy consumption due to active state of large number of nodes 
in WSN without sending any data to destination. The detection mechanism of proposed 
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countermeasure also helps to reduce delay and enhance throughput as shown in figure 4.25 
and 4.26. The proposed countermeasure reduce the delay by reducing the channel waiting 
time and increase throughput by giving quick channel availability to nodes in presence of 
intelligent CH jamming attack. 
C. Measurement using random traffic interval 
 
Figure 4.27:Comparative Energy consumption analysis of Intelligent CH jamming Attack, 
Countermeasure on CH Jamming Attack, TJC and Optimal strategy in realistic conditions 
 
Figure 4.278:Comparative Delay analysis of Intelligent CH jamming Attack, Countermeasure 
on CH Jamming Attack, TJC and Optimal strategy in realistic conditions 
Figure 4.27, 4.28 and 4.29 shows the performance of proposed countermeasure in more 
realistic situations such as by keeping random interval between the data packets and by 
transmitting information or data at different time instead of sending data at same time from 
each node. The realistic situation gives the more insight picture of performance of proposed 
countermeasure in presence of intelligent CH jamming attack.  
Figure 4.27 shows the average energy consumption of intelligent CH jamming attack with 
proposed countermeasure, TJC, optimal strategy countermeasure and without any 
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countermeasure by varying number of malicious nodes. It shows that energy efficiency of 
proposed countermeasure improves in realistic situations too because of technique used. The 
technique used by proposed countermeasure helps to reduce delay and enhances the 
throughput as shown in figure 4.28 and 4.29 respectively. The major reason for performance 
improvement in proposed countermeasure is because of efficient channel availability than 
others.         
 
Figure 4.29: Comparative Throughput analysis of Intelligent CH jamming Attack, 
Countermeasure on CH Jamming Attack, TJC and Optimal strategy in realistic conditions 
4.7 Conclusions 
 
The chapter proposes the different countermeasures to save from jamming attack. The first 
proposed countermeasure TJC, which shows good performance against reactive jamming 
attack with varying traffic interval and number of malicious nodes in a network. The 
proposed TJC algorithm is also tested by considering more realistic conditions where each 
node is not transmitting in particular time interval but nodes are transmitting at different time 
instance. The results in different conditions show that TJC is good solution against reactive 
jamming attack. The simulation of algorithm by considering mobility shows TJC adaptability 
with changing position of nodes in the network. 
The security threats because of jamming attack are increasing in large way and it is necessary 
to understand the conduct of different jamming attack in better manner. The second part of 
chapter gives the modelling of the jamming attack using game theory which explains the 
detailed moves in all kinds of jamming attack in continuous and periodic monitor states. The 
author also finds the Nash equilibrium condition and detection mechanism for jamming 
attack. The detection mechanism shows better performance in terms of energy consumption 
(25-30%), delay, and throughput (10-15%) than existing optimal game theoretic strategy. 
The security threats of jamming attack are increasing and they appear in a network in 
different ways. Chapter 3 gives the brief idea of new jamming attack situation i.e. intelligent 
CH jamming attack which can takes place in cluster-based network. Chapter 4 proposes 
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countermeasure on intelligent CH jamming which shows good performance against proposed 
attack with varying traffic interval and number of malicious nodes in the network. The 
proposed countermeasure also shows good performance with more realistic situation such as 
random traffic interval with number of malicious nodes in network. The proposed 
countermeasure gives 15-20% improvement than state-of-art countermeasures. 
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5 
Secure Key Management 
 
The goal of this chapter is to illustrate the related work in the area 
of key management and compare the different key management 
algorithm according to the technique used. This chapter proposes the 
efficient secure key management technique and discusses the system 
model, proposed key management scheme, and its performance 
evaluation. Security evaluation and performance analysis of the 
proposed scheme shows that overall performance of the proposed 
scheme improves as compared to the state of the art. 
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5.1 Introduction 
 
Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is a network of small sensor nodes, which communicate 
with each other using radio. Nowadays WSN has been used in many different real time and 
mission critical applications. The use of WSN in mission critical application produces the 
new requirement to the WSN application. These requirements are security and mobility. The 
security is important in WSN to save it from malicious attack and mobility is necessary to 
increase the area of network reachability. It is difficult and challenging to address these two 
issues together.  The objective of this chapter is to address WSN security in mobile scenarios 
[1,2]. 
The WSN security is more complex and constrained as compared with traditional security 
mechanisms. The major research on WSN concentrated on the cryptographic solution for the 
security. The cryptographic solutions are mainly concentrating on to the key management 
issues. Different types of key management algorithms are proposed in the literature by 
considering different network management and sharing of key among the different nodes. 
Large numbers of key management algorithms are develop by considering flat network and 
no mobility in the network. The important contribution of this work is key management in 
cluster-based mobile environment. The cluster-based networks are efficient in terms of 
scalability and energy efficiency. These kind of network arrangement helps to improve 
management of keys and reduce the fast penetration of security attack in the network. The 
sensors have limited battery, therefore any key management algorithm for sensor should have 
minimum amount of computation and message transmission. The cluster-based mechanism 
also helps to improve it.   
The chapter proposes the new key management algorithm by considering above stated 
challenges. The challenges are addressed by the new scheme called, Cluster-based Mobile 
Key Management Scheme (CMKMS). The scheme is based on below two WSN case studies 
or scenarios,  
 In the first case, consider a cluster-based mobile sensor network. Here, cluster head 
(CH) is assume static and aggregating information from all other nodes in cluster. The 
other nodes in cluster are mobile nodes and may move from one cluster to other 
cluster. The work considers that CH is acting as a key manger (KM) who manages the 
keys of all nodes inside the cluster. The challenge consider in this scenario is 
whenever a node is changing a position and moving from one CH to other i.e. from 
his home CH (HCH) to foreign CH (FCH).  
 The second case also considers a cluster-based mobile sensor network. Here, assume 
that CH and nodes both are mobile i.e. KM and nodes both are mobile. The proposal 
here is to transfer the key management responsibility to other node in cluster i.e. to 
make new KM or CH in network. The work will assume that whenever the CH or KM 
is coming near to the boundary of cluster it transfer the key management 
responsibilities to other CH by running CH selection algorithm.  
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The proposed scheme satisfy the first case by considering two different private keys for each 
node, one is its home key which is permanent and another is foreign key which many change 
when node is moving from one cluster to other. The second case is satisfied by transferring 
the key manager responsibilities to other node and informs other nodes about new key 
manager. Here, algorithm considers the two phases, first one is setup-phase, which helps to 
establish cluster and distribute the keys in a network. The second phase is controlling the 
maintenance of keys during node mobility. 
The chapter simulates the proposed algorithm using Network Simulator-2 (NS-2) and 
compares its performance with state-of-art key management solution Energy-Efficient 
Distributed Deterministic Key Management for Wireless Sensor Networks (EDDK). The 
results are major in terms of computational overheads, energy consumption, and delay 
required for managing and maintaining the keys. The CMKMS algorithm outperforms over 
EDDK, in static and mobile scenarios. 
5.2 Related Works 
Key management can be deﬁned as a set of techniques and procedures that support the 
establishment and maintenance of keying relationships between authorized parties. The key 
management technique for a secure application must minimally incorporate authenticity, 
conﬁdentiality, integrity, scalability, and ﬂexibility [1]. The different key management 
schemes are majorly classify as [2], 
 Network-wide key 
 Full pairwise 
 Probabilistic 
 Matrix-based 
 Polynomial-based 
 Combinatorial design 
 Deployment knowledge 
Network-wide key: The most straightforward key distribution possible is to have a single 
master key, which is loaded into all sensors. Such simplicity results in a high level of 
efficiency and ﬂexibility, requiring minimal memory for the storage of keys no matter the 
size of the network. By loading the master key in new nodes, the scheme also allows the 
introduction of any number of sensors after the initial deployment. Furthermore, since all 
nodes certainly share the same master key, this scheme provides perfect key connectivity. 
Full pairwise: In this case, each of the n nodes in the network receives n-1 pairwise keys to 
communicate with every other node. This approach assures a high security level, providing 
features such as node-to-node authentication and perfect resilience, which thwarts node 
replication attacks. It also makes the revocation of individual sensor nodes easier: even 
without the intervention of a secure base station, the nodes on the network may identify 
malicious IDs and revoke the corresponding pairwise keys. 
Probabilistic: In probabilistic schemes, each node receives a group of keys, the so-called key 
chain, whose size is normally much lower than the size of the network itself. The reasoning 
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behind this strategy is to provide a good key connectivity and, at the same time, avoid both 
the memory overhead involved in the Full Pairwise scheme and the low security level offered 
by a single master key. 
Matrix-based: Matrix-based scheme allows the creation of pairwise keys. It makes node 
authentication and revocation functionalities easier. Additionally, the scheme provides 
perfect key connectivity and its resilience. 
Polynomial-based: The scheme is non-interactive; it does not add communication overhead 
to the key establishment process. Thus, the main constraints in this solution are the memory 
required for storing polynomial shares and the processing power needed for its operations. 
Combinatorial design: Here, the keys those are preloaded into each node are carefully 
selected in a deterministic and optimized manner. These strategies are more adequate for 
adoption in dense networks since the key connectivity achieved by them depends on the 
proximity of the nodes. 
Deployment knowledge: These schemes are deployment specific. They show higher 
flexibility and efficiency because they are built by considering specific deployment scenario. 
Table 5.1:  Comparison of key management schemes 
Scheme Scalability (S) 
Node 
Authentication (A) 
Deployment 
Knowledge(D) 
BROSK [3] High No No 
LKMS [4] Moderate No No 
Full Pairwise [5]  Low Yes No 
Q-Composite [6]  Moderate No No 
Multipath key 
reinforcement [6] 
Moderate No No 
Pairwise key 
establishment [7] 
Moderate No No 
RGM [8] Moderate No No 
Blom’s Scheme [9]  Moderate Yes No 
Multiple space key [10]  Low Yes No 
Grid-based [11]  Moderate Yes No 
DMBS [12]  Moderate No No 
GQ Design [13]  Moderate No No 
Group-based deployment 
[1]  
High No Yes 
Closet Pairwise keys [13] High Yes Yes 
HGKM [14] Moderate Yes Yes 
Matrical Closet Pairwise 
[15] 
Moderate Yes Yes 
EDDK[18] High Yes Yes 
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5.3 CMKMS: Cluster-based Mobile Key Management Scheme 
5.3.1 System Model and Notation used 
 
 
Figure 5.1: System model for key management 
Figure 5.1 shows the considered system model for designing efficient key management 
scheme for wireless sensor network. The system model shows the network which is divided 
into number of clusters. The cluster is used to improve the scalability and energy efficiency 
of system. Each cluster consists of cluster head (CH) which aggregates the information from 
all sensor nodes (SN) in the cluster and transfers the aggregated information to the other CH 
or to the BS. The communication in between the SN to SN is intra-cluster communication 
which takes place via SN to SN link. The transmission in between the CH to CH or CH to BS 
is inter-cluster communication which takes place via CH to CH link or CH to BS link. The 
key management algorithm here considers the CH as key manger. The work make an 
assumption that SN can move from one position to another but CH and BS are fixed at one 
position.  
The notations used for explaining the algorithm are as follows, 
 Ni : Node ID 
 Ci : Cluster ID 
 Kh : Home key 
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 Kf : Foreign key 
 Nc: Average number of nodes per cluster 
 nc : Number of cluster in the network 
 l : Average number of cluster neighbour 
 MACk : Hash function 
5.3.2 Working Mechanism 
 
The working of algorithm is dividing into two parts, which are as follows, 
 Setup phase: It establish the cluster in a network and setup the cluster keys in a 
network. 
 Key maintenance: The key maintenance is responsible for maintaining and managing 
the key during node mobility. 
A. Setup Phase 
Setup phase consist of two parts, organizing network into clusters and setting up a cluster 
keys for each cluster. It is responsible for establishing secure link between clusters to make 
the whole network connect securely. Here, consider that each SN is assigned a unique ID that 
identifies them distinctly in a network. The algorithm considers that each node maintains the 
two keys, key Kh i.e. home key and another Kf i.e. foreign key. Kh is used to do 
communication inside its own cluster and Kf is used to perform communication with foreign 
CH or nodes during node mobility. These keys will be used for secure information exchange 
in between the nodes.  
In first part (as shown in Figure 5.2), after deployment, each node waits a random time before 
broadcasting the following HELLO message to declare its decision to become a cluster head 
Ek{Ni|Kh,Ni|Kf,MACk(Ni|Kh),MACk(Ni|Kf)}.Upon receiving a HELLO message, if the node has 
decided its role, it rejects all messages to avoid becoming cluster head and member at the 
same time. If the node has not decided yet, it responses only the HELLO, cancels timer, send 
ACK back and joins the cluster of the node that sent the message. The ACK message 
contains its id encrypted with key Kh and Kf. Then node set Ci=Ni  and set Kh and Kf  as cluster 
keys. The cluster head construct the polynomial by using,              
      
  . 
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Figure 5.2:Flow chart for Key Management Setup phase part 1 
The aim of the second part (shown in Figure 5.3) is to make the whole network connect 
securely. In the algorithm, nodes store cluster key of other neighbour clusters in the form of 
foreign key Kf. Once a node is compromised, it’s all neighbour clusters must be evicted from 
network. In order to solve this problem, the algorithm generate a unique pairwise key for 
each neighbour nodes pair. For example, node 1 and node 2 are neighbour nodes pair in 
different cluster, they can establish pairwise key. The pairwise key is generated as follows, 
node 1 and node 2 exchange their foreign keys encrypted by home key: Ek{Ci|Kh|Kf, 
MACk(Ci|Kh|Kf)}. Nodes in the same cluster will ignore the message, while any nodes from 
neighbouring clusters store {Ci|Kh|Kf}. Then nodes located in two different clusters can 
compute their pairwise key, such as node 1 and node 2, they compute their pairwise key by 
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computing:        
          
        
 . Then neighbour clusters can establish secure links 
in a network. 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Flowchart for Key Management Setup phase part 2 
B. Key Maintenance 
The key maintenance phase tries to maintain the keys in following different situations, 
 Case 1: When new node join the cluster 
 Case 2: When any node move from one cluster to  the other cluster 
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Figure 5.4:  Key Maintenance Case 1 sequence diagram 
As shown in figure 5.4, when new members supposed to join the cluster, it will beacons the 
message with its id. The beacon message is received by some neighbouring nodes and 
forwards it to the CH, or it may also receive it by CH directly. CH broadcast this message to 
other member and to other cluster heads. When new member join the cluster it will get the 
home key and foreign key by running the setup phase. 
 
Figure 5.5:  Key Maintenance Case 2 sequence diagram 
As shown in figure 5.5, when a node wants to move from cluster it sends beacon message to 
CH that it wants to move from one cluster to other. CH updates the information to its 
members and to the neighbouring CH that node is moving from my territory to another one. 
Therefore the neighbouring cluster is getting understanding that the particular node will 
communicate with us using other cluster foreign key. 
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5.4 Simulation and Comparative Evaluation 
 
5.4.1 Simulation Details 
Table 5.2: Simulation and node parameters 
Parameter Name Setting Used 
Network Interface type Wireless Physical:802.15.4 
Radio Propagation Model Two-Ray Ground 
Antenna Omni-directional antenna 
Channel Type Wireless Channel 
Link Layer Link Layer (LL) 
Interface Queue Priority Queue 
Buffer size of IFq 50 
MAC 802.15.4 
Routing Protocol Ad-hoc routing 
Energy Model EnergyModel 
Initial Energy (initialEnergy_) 100J 
Idle Power (idlePower_) 31mW 
Receiving Power (rxPower_) 35mW 
Transmission Power (txPower_) 31mW 
Sleep Power (sleepPower_) 15μW 
Number of nodes Varying from 25 to 250 
Node Placement Random 
 
The implementation is performing by using discrete event simulator NS-2 (Network 
Simulator-2) [16]. The parameters set during simulations are as shown in Table 5.2. The idle 
power, receiving power, transmission power, and sleep power are as consider according to 
IEEE 802.15.4 radio model [17]. The implementation uses RC5 (with 12 rounds) as the block 
cipher to implement the encryption/decryption algorithm. The simulations also used MAC 
with RC5 to provide the pseudo random functions that is use to derive the individual keys as 
well as the pairwise keys. The performance of the proposed algorithm is compare with state 
of art algorithm Energy-Efficient Distributed Deterministic Key Management for Wireless 
Sensor Networks (EDDK) [18]. The simulation of EDDK and CMKMS are perform by 
considering same simulation and node parameters. 
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The simulations are performed in following different conditions. The different conditions 
are, 
 WSN without any mobility 
 WSN with random mobility speed and random number of mobile nodes. 
The performance of the proposed mechanism is measure by using three parameters 
computational overheads, average energy consumption, and average delay. 
Computational overheads: The computational overheads are mainly major by considering the 
work of setup phase/initialization phase. The computation overhead for each node includes 
the encryption and authentication of the local broadcast message, the veriﬁcation and 
decryption of the received messages from neighbours, and the computation of the 
pseudorandom function. 
Average Energy Consumption: The average energy consumption is majorly the average of 
energy spend during the different phases. It considers the average of energy spend by all 
nodes in the network. The energy consumption is directly proportional to computational 
overheads, if computational overhead will increase its effect on increasing energy 
consumption. 
Average Delay: The average delay is concern with computational overheads. The failure and 
maintenance of key increase the delay of each node in system. The average delay considered 
is the average of total delay of each node in network. 
5.4.2 Results and Comparative Evaluation 
A. Results without WSN Mobility 
In case of key management algorithms, large numbers of overheads are incurring during 
network initialization phase. The network initialization includes the encryption and 
authentication of the local broadcast messages, the verification, and decryption of the 
received message from neighbours and calculation of functions. The overheads are majorly 
measure in terms of computation overheads, which shows number of packets transmitted for 
initialization, average- energy, and delay incurred for it.  
Figure 5.6, 5.7, and 5.8 show the computation overhead in terms of packets transmission, 
average energy consumption in joules and average delay in millisecond respectively. These 
three results are measure by varying the number of nodes in the network from 25 to 250. The 
result shows that proposed scheme CMKMS shows fewer overheads than EDDK. The major 
reason of the lower performance of EDDK than CMKMS is, EDDK considers local cluster 
key and pairwise keys for each node while CMKMS consider local, and foreign keys for each 
cluster nodes and pairwise keys only for the common nodes in between the clusters. The 
overheads incurred for establishing local cluster key and pairwise key is more than 
establishing keys in CMKMS algorithm. Another reason of improved performance of 
CMKMS over EDDK is that CMKMS uses less complex function than EDDK. 
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Figure 5.6: Comparative Key management computational overheads of EDDK & CMKMS 
under varying number of nodes without mobility 
 
Figure 5.7: Comparative Key management average energy consumption performance of 
EDDK & CMKMS under varying number of nodes without mobility 
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Figure 5.8: Comparative Key management average delay performance of EDDK & CMKMS 
under varying number of nodes without mobility 
B. Results with Random WSN Mobility 
Figures 5.9, 5.10, and 5.11 shows the performance of EDDK and CMKMS in realistic 
situations. The simulation considers that the nodes in the network are mobile which moves 
from one position to another expect the CH. The above results of computational overheads, 
average energy consumption, and average delay show that performance overheads in case of 
mobility are more than the results without mobility. The main reason of increasing 
performance overhead is when node goes mobile, it changes its neighbourhood. The change 
in neighbourhood directly effects on calculation of pairwise- and individual keys. Here, the 
performance of EDDK is lower than CMKMS. The major reason of lower performance of 
EDDK is that, it calculates the pairwise keys and change in neighbourhood effect on 
calculation of pairwise keys, which may give wrong instance of pairwise keys and need the 
recalculation of pairwise keys.        
 
Figure 5.9: Comparative Key management computational overheads of EDDK & CMKMS 
under varying number of nodes with mobility 
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Figure 5.10: Comparative Key management average energy consumption performance of 
EDDK & CMKMS under varying number of nodes with mobility
 
Figure 5.11: Comparative Key management average delay performance of EDDK & 
CMKMS under varying number of nodes with mobility 
C. Results with Mobile CH 
Figure 5.12, 5.13, and 5.15 shows the performance of EDDK and CMKMS in case of more 
proficient scenario where CHs are also mobile likes other nodes. The above results of 
computational overheads, average energy consumption, and average delay show that 
performance overheads in case of mobile CH are more than previous results. The main 
reasons of increasing performance overhead when CH goes mobile are: (i) it changes its 
neighbourhood and the change in neighbourhood effect on calculation of keys, pairwise- and 
individual keys and (ii) it also reflects in re-election of CHs. Here, the performance of EDDK 
is lower than CMKMS. The major reason of lower performance of EDDK is that, it calculates 
the pairwise keys and change in neighbourhood effect on calculation of pairwise keys, which 
may give wrong instance of pairwise keys and need the recalculation of pairwise keys.        
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Figure 5.12: Comparative Key management computational overheads of EDDK & CMKMS 
under varying number of nodes and mobile CH 
 
 
Figure 5.13: Comparative Key management average energy consumption performance of 
EDDK & CMKMS under varying number of nodes and mobile CH 
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Figure 5.14: Comparative Key management average delay performance of EDDK & 
CMKMS under varying number of nodes and mobile CH 
5.5 Conclusions 
 
The growing demands of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) in variety of real time and 
mission-critical applications, increases the challenges in terms of energy efficiency, security 
and mobility. The security is important to avoid malicious attacks and improve the energy 
efficiency, while mobility helps to improve the reachability of network.  
The chapter addresses these two issues by proposing new Cluster-based Mobile Key 
Management Scheme (CMKMS). The CMKMS algorithm focused on the management and 
maintenance of keys under cluster-based mobile WSN network. The scheme consider two 
phases, first for key maintenance which establish the two private keys, home key for own 
cluster and foreign key when node moves from one cluster to another. The second phase 
maintain the keys when cluster head (CH) moves from one cluster to another. The proposed 
algorithm improves the efficiency of key management algorithm in terms of security, 
mobility, energy efficiency, and scalability of network. The simulation of scheme in different 
realistic situation shows that proposed solution shows less computational overheads, energy 
consumption and delay as compared with state-of-art solution. 
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6 
Conclusions and Future 
Work 
 
This chapter concludes the thesis and proposes the future work, 
which can be researched and build based on the ideas proposed. This 
thesis addresses the security issues in the IoT and proposes an 
embedded security framework for IoT. The thesis have given major 
contribution in embedded IoT security framework, AES-GCM based 
embedded security protocol, taxonomy of different IoT security 
attacks, modelling and analysis of different types of jamming attacks, 
development of countermeasures on jamming attack, explore the 
possibilities of new kind of jamming attacks and development of 
countermeasures on it, and development of new lightweight key 
management technique by considering mobile scenarios of wireless 
sensor network. The novel methods together with implementation and 
simulation results are presented in this thesis. Throughout the thesis, 
either the proof of concept, simulation results and the implementation 
results are presented to validate the finding. 
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6.1 Summary of contributions 
 
This chapter gives the summary of the thesis contributions with concluding remark on 
each contribution. Then the future work for each of the milestone that can be built upon this 
thesis is presented. The thesis mainly addressed the issues in embedded security by 
considering the IoT scenario and developed the mechanism to save IoT from jamming attack. 
The main three challenges consider in thesis are designing efficient IoT security framework, 
security solution on jamming attack, and key management in WSN-IoT. The thesis have 
given major contribution in embedded IoT security framework, AES-GCM-based embedded 
security protocol, taxonomy of different IoT security attacks, modelling and analysis of 
different types of jamming attacks, development of countermeasures on jamming attack, 
explore the possibilities of new kind of jamming attacks and development of countermeasures 
on it, and development of new optimized key management technique by considering mobile 
scenarios of wireless sensor network. 
 
In the first chapter, thesis describes the security as the main pillar in IoT pillars. The thesis 
described the importance of IoT security by considering different real time example such as 
virtual shopping scenario for IoT. The requirements of IoT security are understood by using 
given example and derived the different objectives of the IoT in concern with security. The 
survey of IoT security framework had given the high level security requirements for IoT, as 
user identification, tamper resistant, secure software execution, secure content, secure 
network access, availability, secure data communications, identity management and secure 
storage. The chapter surveys the different security attacks on IoT such as physical attacks, 
side channel attacks, cryptanalysis attacks and software attacks and network attacks. All 
considered attack reduced the performance of IoT in major amount. The thesis considered the 
jamming attack, which is one of the denial of service attack, it harm the network in large 
amount by taking total control of the network. The chapter describes the motivation and 
problem statement of the thesis by understanding the different IoT scenarios, security 
frameworks, and security attacks. The chapter gives insight on the methodology used for 
completing the research, which helps to understand the flow of research and different 
development stages of research. The chapter also describes the novelty and contribution of 
research in figure 1.8 of Chapter 1, which helps to understand the evolution of research and 
problem addressed.  
 
The security frameworks play a major role in performance improvement of the IoT. The 
chapter 2 addressed it by considering the embedded security in IoT, which consist of three 
approaches software only approach, hardware only approach and hybrid approach. The thesis 
has given the functionality comparison in between different types of embedded security 
approaches by considering countermeasures against attack and optimization of the basic 
security functions. The comparison helps to understand the different embedded security 
issues in IoT and help to enhance the embedded security by proposing the embedded security 
framework and architecture in figure 2.3 of chapter 2.  The security consideration for IoT 
security evolved into AES-GCM-based embedded security protocol. The protocol consists of 
capability structure, which is combination of unique object identifier, access right, and 
randomization. The protocol is evaluated in terms of mutual authentication, replay attack 
resistance, and computation, traffic, and storage cost. AES-GCM provides both efficient 
authentication and encryption with efficient low cost implementation in resource-constrained 
devices.  
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The thesis considers jamming attack as major attack on WSN. The Chapter 3 survey the 
different jamming attacks and modelled them using activity and sequential modelling 
technique. The activity and sequential modelling of jamming attack gives the insights of the 
working of attack, which will be an efficient tool to develop the defensive mechanism against 
jamming attack. The evaluation of jamming attack describes in chapter conclude that the 
reactive jamming attack is one of the most disastrous jamming attack. The growing 
deployment of cluster-based network has given major possibility of attack in WSN-IoT. The 
chapter proposes the new possibility of jamming attack i.e. intelligent CH attack, which 
attack on CH and increase the possibility of hazards in the network. The intelligent CH 
jamming attack is compared with reactive jamming attack, which shows that intelligent CH 
jamming attacks are more destructive than reactive jamming attack. The modelling and 
evaluation of jamming attack gives the requirements to design efficient defense mechanism 
against jamming. The requirements considers the cross-layer features for efficient detection 
of attack, cluster-based network and use of threshold-based and game theoretic approach for 
developing efficient mechanism.  
 
The fourth chapter majorly describes the classification of jamming countermeasures and 
compared different jamming countermeasures by considering type of technique, mechanism 
used, energy efficiency, and implementation cost. The comparative discussion gives the 
major advantages and disadvantages of existing approaches, which gives insight to develop 
new jamming countermeasure. The chapter made the three major contributions first one is 
TJC algorithm, second is game theory-based approach for jamming detection, and last is 
countermeasure on CH jamming attack. The TJC-based algorithm is based on send threshold 
of each node. The simulation of algorithm shows that TJC algorithm shows better 
performance against reactive jamming attack. The TJC algorithm also shows good 
performance in presence of increased number of jamming nodes in a network. The 
disadvantage of algorithm is that, it increase the overheads by maintain send threshold on 
each node. The game theory-based countermeasure, counteract to all kind of jamming attack 
in WSN. It considers the cross layer approach to detect wrong moves during the jamming 
game. The proposed game theory-based approach shows scalable performance in different 
realistic situations as compared with state-of-art solutions. The last contribution of chapter is 
countermeasure against cluster-based jamming, which is developed by extending TJC 
countermeasure for cluster-based network. It also helps to maintain safe situation in network 
form inter- and intra- cluster attacks. 
 
The last chapter addressed the key management issue in WSN-IoT by considering 
mobility scenario. The major contribution of chapter is Cluster-based Mobile Key 
Management Scheme (CMKMS) for efficiently managing the keys under cluster-based 
mobile WSN network. The scheme consider two phases, first for key maintenance which 
establish the two private keys, home key for own cluster and foreign key when node moves 
from one cluster to another. The second phase maintain the keys when cluster head (CH) 
moves from one cluster to another. The proposed algorithm improves the efficiency of key 
management algorithm in terms of security, mobility, energy efficiency, and scalability of 
network. The simulation of scheme in different realistic situation shows that proposed 
solution shows less computational overheads, energy consumption, and delay as compared 
with state-of-art solution. 
 
Hence, the thesis proposes the new architecture for IoT security and supporting defensive 
mechanism against jamming attack on IoT. The proposed solutions enable to enhance the 
secure and reliable applicability of IoT in increased application domain. 
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6.2 Future Work 
 
Every research is complete and incomplete on its own sense of understanding. Therefore, 
there is always a scope to improve it and enhance it for better applicability. The address 
research problem on IoT security will be enhance in following ways, 
 
 The research proposed the embedded security framework and architecture; this 
architecture will be enhance to improve the efficiency of embedded security by 
considering lightweight cryptography, physical security for trusted platforms, 
standardized the security protocols, secure operating system and secure storage. 
 
 The IoT will also be improving in better manner by considering authorization, trust, 
and privacy at same time. It will directly effect on high level of interconnections 
between things and services. 
 
 The thesis approaches to security and privacy during communication in IoT. The 
security and privacy will be also address during naming and addressing of IoT 
devices. Device discovery and network discovery of IoT devices will be made more 
secure by considering trust and reputation for its working mechanism.   
 
 The thesis concentrate on modelling and development of countermeasure by 
considering jamming attack at physical layer and MAC layer, but it can be extend by 
considering combine effect of jamming on all layers of IoT protocol stack. 
 
 The countermeasure was majorly developed by considering only the jamming attack. 
The work will be extend by considering combine effect of other IoT attacks such as 
physical attack, side channel attacks, cryptanalysis attack, software attack and 
network attack.  
 
 The solution developed in thesis considered one or two cross layer features for 
effectively detecting the attack. The better solution will be developed by considering 
multi-cross layer features for jamming countermeasures. 
 
 The future work for CMKMS is to exploit the key management algorithm according 
to specific attack such as jamming attack. The work can also be extended by 
considering the different kind of message patterns in the network. 
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